更新、证据评估和操作者可用性:理解信念的理论框架。

IF 5.1 1区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY
Psychological review Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Epub Date: 2023-08-17 DOI:10.1037/rev0000444
Joseph Sommer, Julien Musolino, Pernille Hemmer
{"title":"更新、证据评估和操作者可用性:理解信念的理论框架。","authors":"Joseph Sommer, Julien Musolino, Pernille Hemmer","doi":"10.1037/rev0000444","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Decades of findings in psychology suggest that human belief is thoroughly irrational. At best, beliefs might be formed by heuristic processes that predictably lead to suboptimal outcomes. At worst, they are slaves to motivated reasoning, which allows people to come to whichever conclusions they prefer. In this article, we suggest that belief updating, narrowly construed, may be a rational process that is uniquely sensitive to evidence and cognitively impenetrable to desires or incentives. Before any updating can occur, however, a series of processes mediate between information in the world and subjectively compelling evidence. We distinguish between updating proper and processes of evidence search, acceptance, hypothesis specification, integration of relevant information, and reasoning. We review research highlighting the computational difficulty inherent to each of these problems and conclude that solutions must be heuristic and fallible. Beyond incidental failures, evidence evaluation processes-unlike updating-are penetrable to motivation and as such, may be biased by people's desires and goals. In light of this distinction, we propose a theoretical framework for integrating research on belief which divides the cognitive processes involved in belief into two distinct levels. At Level 1, updating is suggested to be approximately Bayesian and impenetrable to desires and goals. In contrast, Level 2 processes, which search for and evaluate evidence, are cognitively penetrable. In addition, we emphasize that Level 2 processes are necessarily heuristic and exhibit bounded rationality (Simon, 1956) given the difficulty of the problems they have to solve. Finally, we specify an additional set of relatively invariant characteristics, which influence how Level 2 processes are employed by making different methods of information processing available. Our framework offers a more nuanced understanding of belief, permits a granular localization of irrationality, and may help reconcile extant debates in the literature. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"373-401"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Updating, evidence evaluation, and operator availability: A theoretical framework for understanding belief.\",\"authors\":\"Joseph Sommer, Julien Musolino, Pernille Hemmer\",\"doi\":\"10.1037/rev0000444\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Decades of findings in psychology suggest that human belief is thoroughly irrational. At best, beliefs might be formed by heuristic processes that predictably lead to suboptimal outcomes. At worst, they are slaves to motivated reasoning, which allows people to come to whichever conclusions they prefer. In this article, we suggest that belief updating, narrowly construed, may be a rational process that is uniquely sensitive to evidence and cognitively impenetrable to desires or incentives. Before any updating can occur, however, a series of processes mediate between information in the world and subjectively compelling evidence. We distinguish between updating proper and processes of evidence search, acceptance, hypothesis specification, integration of relevant information, and reasoning. We review research highlighting the computational difficulty inherent to each of these problems and conclude that solutions must be heuristic and fallible. Beyond incidental failures, evidence evaluation processes-unlike updating-are penetrable to motivation and as such, may be biased by people's desires and goals. In light of this distinction, we propose a theoretical framework for integrating research on belief which divides the cognitive processes involved in belief into two distinct levels. At Level 1, updating is suggested to be approximately Bayesian and impenetrable to desires and goals. In contrast, Level 2 processes, which search for and evaluate evidence, are cognitively penetrable. In addition, we emphasize that Level 2 processes are necessarily heuristic and exhibit bounded rationality (Simon, 1956) given the difficulty of the problems they have to solve. Finally, we specify an additional set of relatively invariant characteristics, which influence how Level 2 processes are employed by making different methods of information processing available. Our framework offers a more nuanced understanding of belief, permits a granular localization of irrationality, and may help reconcile extant debates in the literature. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":21016,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Psychological review\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"373-401\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Psychological review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000444\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2023/8/17 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Psychological review","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000444","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2023/8/17 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

心理学数十年的研究结果表明,人类的信念是完全非理性的。在最好的情况下,信念可能是由启发式过程形成的,可预见地导致次优结果。在最坏的情况下,它们是动机推理的奴隶,动机推理允许人们得出自己喜欢的结论。在本文中,我们提出,狭义上的信念更新可能是一种理性过程,它对证据具有独特的敏感性,并且在认知上不受欲望或动机的影响。然而,在任何更新发生之前,世界上的信息和主观上令人信服的证据之间需要一系列的过程进行调解。我们将更新本身与证据搜索、接受、假设规范、整合相关信息和推理等过程区分开来。我们回顾了强调这些问题中每个问题内在计算难度的研究,并得出结论:解决方案必须是启发式和易错的。除了偶然的失误之外,证据评估过程与更新不同,可以渗透到动机中,因此可能会受到人们的愿望和目标的影响。根据这一区别,我们提出了一个整合信念研究的理论框架,将信念所涉及的认知过程分为两个不同的层次。在第一层次,更新被认为是近似贝叶斯的,不受欲望和目标的影响。与此相反,第二层次的过程,即搜索和评估证据的过程,在认知上是可以穿透的。此外,我们还强调,第二级过程必然是启发式的,鉴于其所要解决的问题的难度,第二级过程表现出有限理性(Simon,1956 年)。最后,我们还明确了一组相对不变的特征,这些特征通过提供不同的信息处理方法来影响第二级过程的使用方式。我们的框架提供了对信念更细致入微的理解,允许对非理性进行细化定位,并可能有助于调和文献中的现有争论。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Updating, evidence evaluation, and operator availability: A theoretical framework for understanding belief.

Decades of findings in psychology suggest that human belief is thoroughly irrational. At best, beliefs might be formed by heuristic processes that predictably lead to suboptimal outcomes. At worst, they are slaves to motivated reasoning, which allows people to come to whichever conclusions they prefer. In this article, we suggest that belief updating, narrowly construed, may be a rational process that is uniquely sensitive to evidence and cognitively impenetrable to desires or incentives. Before any updating can occur, however, a series of processes mediate between information in the world and subjectively compelling evidence. We distinguish between updating proper and processes of evidence search, acceptance, hypothesis specification, integration of relevant information, and reasoning. We review research highlighting the computational difficulty inherent to each of these problems and conclude that solutions must be heuristic and fallible. Beyond incidental failures, evidence evaluation processes-unlike updating-are penetrable to motivation and as such, may be biased by people's desires and goals. In light of this distinction, we propose a theoretical framework for integrating research on belief which divides the cognitive processes involved in belief into two distinct levels. At Level 1, updating is suggested to be approximately Bayesian and impenetrable to desires and goals. In contrast, Level 2 processes, which search for and evaluate evidence, are cognitively penetrable. In addition, we emphasize that Level 2 processes are necessarily heuristic and exhibit bounded rationality (Simon, 1956) given the difficulty of the problems they have to solve. Finally, we specify an additional set of relatively invariant characteristics, which influence how Level 2 processes are employed by making different methods of information processing available. Our framework offers a more nuanced understanding of belief, permits a granular localization of irrationality, and may help reconcile extant debates in the literature. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Psychological review
Psychological review 医学-心理学
CiteScore
9.70
自引率
5.60%
发文量
97
期刊介绍: Psychological Review publishes articles that make important theoretical contributions to any area of scientific psychology, including systematic evaluation of alternative theories.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信