Christina Watts, Melissa Jones, Kylie Lindorff, Becky Freeman
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Objectives and importance of the study: The study investigates and documents how tobacco companies are using the revolving door between government and industry as a tactic to try to influence public health policymaking in Australia. This is the first Australian study to systematically investigate the revolving door tactic in tobacco lobbying and highlights the importance of strengthening integrity and transparency legislation and oversight bodies to eliminate the political influence of tobacco companies in Australia.
Study type: Mixed-methods including non-experimental descriptive and exploratory case studies.
Methods: To build a picture of tobacco lobbying through the revolving door in Australia, data was triangulated from multiple publicly available sources: 1) Australian federal, state and territory government lobbyist registers, 2) the online social networking platform, LinkedIn; and 3) Australian news media reports.
Results: Tobacco companies lobby the Australian government using 'in-house' employees, lobbyists working in firms acting on their behalf, and third-party allies with common interests. Almost half (48%) of internal tobacco company lobbyists had held positions in the Australian government (state, territory and/or federal) before or after working in the tobacco industry. Likewise, 55% of lobbyists acting on behalf of tobacco companies had held government positions before or after working as a lobbyist. In-house tobacco industry lobbyists, as well as those working on behalf of tobacco companies within lobbying firms, were found to have held senior governmental positions, such as a Member of Parliament (MP) or Senator, chief or deputy chief of staff, or senior advisor in a ministerial office, and many had moved into or out of government within 1 year of working for a tobacco company (56%) or as a lobbyist (48%).
Conclusions: Tobacco companies are strategically using the revolving door between the government and the tobacco industry as a key political lobbying mechanism to try to influence public health policy in Australia.
期刊介绍：
Public Health Research & Practice is an open-access, quarterly, online journal with a strong focus on the connection between research, policy and practice. It publishes innovative, high-quality papers that inform public health policy and practice, paying particular attention to innovations, data and perspectives from policy and practice. The journal is published by the Sax Institute, a national leader in promoting the use of research evidence in health policy. Formerly known as The NSW Public Health Bulletin, the journal has a long history. It was published by the NSW Ministry of Health for nearly a quarter of a century. Responsibility for its publication transferred to the Sax Institute in 2014, and the journal receives guidance from an expert editorial board.
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