How explicit expected value information affects tax compliance decisions and information acquisition

IF 2.5 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Martin Müller , Jerome Olsen , Erich Kirchler , Christoph Kogler
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Abstract

In a MouselabWEB experiment with 345 participants, we investigated whether different presentations of expected value information in tax compliance decisions increase conformity with classical deterrence models’ assumptions. Recording both choice and process data, we compare conditions of verbal explanation only, verbal explanation plus numerical cue, verbal explanation plus visual cue, and a control condition without expected value information. Only when the expected value was presented as a visual cue the option with the higher expected value (i.e., evasion) was chosen more often than the control condition (58.3% vs. 38.4%). Nevertheless, individuals were more compliant than predicted by the deterrence model. While we identified differences between the experimental conditions in information acquisition patterns and decision times, they do not suggest that one way of presenting expected value information was easier to process than the others or that the main behavioral effect can be explained by higher saliency of the visual cue. These results indicate that individuals' decisions are not predominantly driven by outcome maximization, even when explicit expected value information is provided.

明确的期望值信息如何影响税务合规决策和信息获取
在一项有345名参与者的MouselabWEB实验中,我们研究了税收合规决策中期望值信息的不同表达是否会增加对经典威慑模型假设的遵从性。记录选择和过程数据,我们比较了仅口头解释、口头解释加数字提示、口头解释加视觉提示和没有期望值信息的控制条件。只有当期望值作为视觉提示呈现时,期望值较高的选项(即逃避)比控制条件更常被选择(58.3%对38.4%)。然而,个体比威慑模型预测的更顺从。虽然我们发现了信息获取模式和决策时间的实验条件之间的差异,但这并不意味着呈现预期价值信息的一种方式比其他方式更容易处理,也不意味着主要的行为效应可以用视觉线索的更高显着性来解释。这些结果表明,即使提供了明确的期望值信息,个人的决策也不是主要由结果最大化驱动的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
31.40%
发文量
69
审稿时长
63 days
期刊介绍: The Journal aims to present research that will improve understanding of behavioral, in particular psychological, aspects of economic phenomena and processes. The Journal seeks to be a channel for the increased interest in using behavioral science methods for the study of economic behavior, and so to contribute to better solutions of societal problems, by stimulating new approaches and new theorizing about economic affairs. Economic psychology as a discipline studies the psychological mechanisms that underlie economic behavior. It deals with preferences, judgments, choices, economic interaction, and factors influencing these, as well as the consequences of judgements and decisions for economic processes and phenomena. This includes the impact of economic institutions upon human behavior and well-being. Studies in economic psychology may relate to different levels of aggregation, from the household and the individual consumer to the macro level of whole nations. Economic behavior in connection with inflation, unemployment, taxation, economic development, as well as consumer information and economic behavior in the market place are thus among the fields of interest. The journal also encourages submissions dealing with social interaction in economic contexts, like bargaining, negotiation, or group decision-making. The Journal of Economic Psychology contains: (a) novel reports of empirical (including: experimental) research on economic behavior; (b) replications studies; (c) assessments of the state of the art in economic psychology; (d) articles providing a theoretical perspective or a frame of reference for the study of economic behavior; (e) articles explaining the implications of theoretical developments for practical applications; (f) book reviews; (g) announcements of meetings, conferences and seminars.
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