Multiple directorships and the extent of loan loss provisions: Evidence from banks in South Asia

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Shawgat S. Kutubi , Kamran Ahmed , Hayat Khan , Mukesh Garg
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This paper examines whether directors with multiple directorships affect extent of banks' loan loss provisions in South Asia. Our results indicate that directors with multiple directorships tend to delay the recognition of loan loss provisions. Specifically, we find the existence of a U-shaped relationship between directors with multiple directorships and loan loss provisions, indicating that the delay is more pronounced in the case of moderately busy directors than in that of directors with fewer directorships and time-poor over-boarded directors. This helps directors achieve profitability targets while maintaining their reputations and indicates their optimism about the loans’ future. Our results are robust in terms of accounting for endogeneity concerns, which are addressed using a two-stage least squares regression and entropy-balancing methodology as well as some alternative definitions of ‘multiple directorships’ used in the literature.

多重董事和贷款损失准备的程度:来自南亚银行的证据
本文考察了南亚地区多职董事对银行贷款损失准备的影响程度。我们的研究结果表明,具有多个董事职位的董事倾向于延迟确认贷款损失准备。具体而言,我们发现多职董事与贷款损失准备之间存在u型关系,表明中等忙碌董事的延迟比少职董事和时间不足的过多董事的延迟更为明显。这有助于董事们在保持声誉的同时实现盈利目标,并表明他们对贷款的未来持乐观态度。我们的结果在考虑内生性问题方面是稳健的,这是通过两阶段最小二乘回归和熵平衡方法以及文献中使用的“多重董事”的一些替代定义来解决的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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