Macroprudential Policy in the EU: A Political Economy Perspective

Elias Bengtsson
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引用次数: 16

Abstract

Abstract In response to the lessons of the global financial crisis, macroprudential policy is now firmly established as a financial policy area to prevent excessive risk taking in the financial sector and mitigate its effects on the real economy. However, macroprudential policy is facing several challenges relating to its political sensitivity and institutional context. These include political and interest group resistance, weaknesses in the governance framework, and limited institutional memory among policy makers. This article seeks to contribute to the contextual understanding of macroprudential policy by exploring how factors relating to these challenges influence policy in the EU. More specifically, it develops and empirically tests a number of hypotheses on how wider institutional and structural factors influence the actual use of macroprudential measures across Europe. The findings yield considerable support for theoretical predictions that institutions and contexts matter - Political pressure and interest group resistance tend to influence the intensity of macroprudential policy stances. Weaker policy stances characterise countries where banking systems depend on domestic banks, whereas the opposite holds for financial systems with significant market shares of other financial intermediaries. Results on institutional arrangements show that governance arrangements on relating to transparency influence policy stances. The results also indicate that policy makers' inertia is best counteracted by appointing a single macroprudential authority. The results differ somewhat depending on whether countries are based in the Euro zone or not. This suggests that policy frameworks that are multi-layered and complex pose tricky conundrums on how to ensure sufficient institutional autonomy, policy capacity and discretion among macroprudential authorities. This also has implications on other policy areas macroprudential policy, such as microprudential policy, crisis management and fiscal policy.
欧盟宏观审慎政策:政治经济学视角
为应对全球金融危机的教训,宏观审慎政策已被确立为防止金融部门过度冒险并减轻其对实体经济影响的金融政策领域。然而,宏观审慎政策正面临与其政治敏感性和体制背景有关的若干挑战。其中包括政治和利益集团的阻力、治理框架的弱点以及政策制定者的制度记忆有限。本文试图通过探索与这些挑战相关的因素如何影响欧盟的政策,为宏观审慎政策的背景理解做出贡献。更具体地说,它就更广泛的制度和结构因素如何影响整个欧洲宏观审慎措施的实际使用,提出并实证检验了一些假设。研究结果为制度和背景很重要的理论预测提供了相当大的支持——政治压力和利益集团的抵制往往会影响宏观审慎政策立场的强度。较弱的政策立场是银行体系依赖于国内银行的国家的特征,而在其他金融中介机构占有重要市场份额的金融体系则相反。制度安排的结果表明,与透明度有关的治理安排影响政策立场。结果还表明,通过任命单一的宏观审慎监管机构,可以最好地抵消政策制定者的惰性。结果因国家是否在欧元区而有所不同。这表明,多层次和复杂的政策框架对如何确保宏观审慎当局充分的机构自主权、政策能力和自由裁量权构成了棘手的难题。这也对宏观审慎政策、微观审慎政策、危机管理和财政政策等其他政策领域产生影响。
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