The Power of Law Firm Partnership: Why Dominant Rainmakers Will Impede the Immediate, Widespread Implementation of an Autocratic Management Structure

Matthew S. Winings
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Consultants and commentators have suggested that law firms would benefit from the implementation of effective business management practices. Specifically, a number of observers maintain that the partnership model by which virtually all law firms operate is outdated and inefficient. To alleviate this inefficiency, commentators claim that law firms could experience tremendous gains through the adoption of a corporate management model. Although the proposals advanced by observers differ slightly, the basic premise of the suggested solutions requires law firms to replace (or at least modify) their partnerships with a rational management structure in favor of a centralized leader who can best maximize efficient client service and lawyer satisfaction. Although sound in theory, this paper argues that such a transformation is likely to be extremely difficult, given the current distribution of power within the large law firm. More specifically, a structural conflict exists between the best interests of the firm and the firm's most powerful rainmaking partners because the dominant rainmakers are both mobile and the most powerful actors within law firms. Law firms rely heavily on their most productive star lawyers because these individuals generate a significant amount of revenue and service the firm's most important clients. Consequently, these partners wield a considerable amount of power within the firm. But because the new model requires that power shift from the rainmaking partners to a centralized leader, it is unlikely that the powerful partners will easily relinquish the authority and influence they currently enjoy. Consequently, those attempting to modify the firm's management structure, and therefore alter the distribution of power within the firm, have the arduous task of garnering the approval of the firm's rainmakers since these are the lawyers who are in a position to thwart any proposed transformation.
律师事务所合伙的权力:为什么占主导地位的造雨者会阻碍专制管理结构的直接、广泛实施
顾问和评论人士建议,律师事务所将从实施有效的商业管理措施中获益。具体来说,一些观察人士认为,几乎所有律师事务所都采用的合伙模式已经过时,效率低下。为了减轻这种低效率,评论员声称,律师事务所可以通过采用公司管理模式获得巨大收益。尽管观察人士提出的建议略有不同,但建议的解决方案的基本前提是要求律师事务所用合理的管理结构取代(或至少修改)他们的合作伙伴关系,以支持能够最大限度地提高客户服务效率和律师满意度的集中式领导者。虽然理论上是合理的,但本文认为,鉴于目前大型律师事务所内部的权力分配,这种转变可能极其困难。更具体地说,律所的最大利益与律所最强大的造雨合伙人之间存在结构性冲突,因为占主导地位的造雨人既是流动的,又是律所内最强大的行动者。律师事务所非常依赖他们最具生产力的明星律师,因为这些人创造了大量的收入,并为公司最重要的客户提供服务。因此,这些合伙人在公司内部拥有相当大的权力。但是,由于新模式要求权力从制造雨的合作伙伴转移到一个集中的领导者身上,强大的合作伙伴不太可能轻易放弃他们目前享有的权威和影响力。因此,那些试图修改公司管理结构,从而改变公司内部权力分配的人,有一项艰巨的任务,那就是获得公司“风云人物”的批准,因为这些律师有能力阻止任何拟议的变革。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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