Introduction: Political Risk and Public Law

IF 3 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Adrian Vermeule
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

On December 15-16, 2011, Harvard Law School convened a conference on “Political Risk and Public Law.” A special issue of the Journal of Legal Analysis will be devoted to publishing papers on this topic by Jon Elster, Edward Glaeser, Eric Posner, Fred Schauer, Mark Tushnet, and myself. The overall aim is to introduce a new set of questions about public law and a new analytical framework for thinking about those questions. The premise of the enterprise is that constitutions and other instruments of public law may fruitfully be viewed as devices for regulating political risks. Large literatures in law, economics, political science and policy studies examine first-order risks that arise from technology, the market, or nature. By contrast, constitutions and foundational statutes, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, may be understood as devices for regulating second-order risks. These are risks that arise from the design of institutions, the allocation of legal and political power among given institutions, and the selection of officials to staff those institutions. This perspective employs the framework of risk analysis elaborated by many disciplines across the social and policy sciences. The framework promises new insights for public law. Constitutional actors have often spoken the prose of risk regulation without knowing it, offering arguments about constitutional and institutional design that implicitly posit second-order risks and offer institutional prescriptions for managing those risks. By bringing the analytic structure of those arguments to the surface, political risk analysis promises to allow a more intelligent description and evaluation of the major problems of public law.
导论:政治风险与公法
2011年12月15日至16日,哈佛大学法学院召开了“政治风险与公法”会议。《法律分析杂志》将有一期专刊专门发表由Jon Elster、Edward Glaeser、Eric Posner、Fred Schauer、Mark Tushnet和我本人撰写的关于这一主题的论文。总体目标是介绍一系列关于公法的新问题以及思考这些问题的新分析框架。这项事业的前提是,宪法和其他公法文书可以被有效地视为调节政治风险的工具。法律、经济学、政治学和政策研究方面的大量文献研究了来自技术、市场或自然的一阶风险。相比之下,宪法和基础性法规,如《行政程序法》,可被理解为调节二阶风险的手段。这些风险来自机构的设计、特定机构之间法律和政治权力的分配以及这些机构工作人员的选择。这种观点采用了社会科学和政策科学中许多学科所阐述的风险分析框架。该框架有望为公法提供新的见解。宪法行为者经常在不知情的情况下谈论风险监管的散文,提出有关宪法和制度设计的论点,这些论点隐含地假设了二阶风险,并提供了管理这些风险的制度处方。通过将这些论点的分析结构呈现出来,政治风险分析有望对公法的主要问题进行更明智的描述和评估。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
审稿时长
16 weeks
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