Revolution By Fiat: the Context of Policy-Making in Peru

Abstract

T HE MILITARY government which took power in Peru in October 1968 is an anomaly among military governments in Latin America. In contrast to Charles Anderson's well-known description of the military coup, which "does not demolish the previous structure of power relationships," but marks the addition of a "new power contender to the "inner circle" of power elites,"' The Peruvian coup is not a holding operation but a watershed event in Peruvian and Latin American history. The government of Juan Velasco Alvarado is committed to, and is implementing, radical changes in the structure of Peruvian society. The regime rejects terms like "reformist" or "modernizing" ;2 rather it sees itself as carrying out a revolution in the name of the people, a revolution without bloodshed, a revolution which will bring economic independence and social harmony to Peru. In the words of the Manifesto, the "Revolutionary Government" is committed to "transform the social, economic and cultural structures," to maintain a "clear, independent position in defense of the national sovereignty" and to achieve these goals in the context of "authority, respect, and observance of the law, and the rule of justice and morality in all areas of national activity." 3 Those responsible for the coup are a small, self-conscious elite, operating within an institution that has important unique features within Peruvian society. The military has been relatively isolated4 from the rest of Peru's elites; the leadership tends to be drawn from the provincial middle classes5 and to have shared common experiences. Data on cabinet members show that many attended Chorillos Military Academy in about the same period (with dates of graduation ranging from 1939 to 1943), and a number attended or taught at the Center for Advanced Military Studies where the fundamental questions of Peru's economic and social development were raised and where the ideology of the current regime is said to have developed. Further, it has been argued that the military leadership was galvanized into action by its experiences with rural guerrilla movements in 1962 and 1965. Although the effort required to suppress these movements seems to have been quite minimal, there is no question that the military took the existence of a rural peasant threat and its link to urban based leftist movements quite seriously, as is evidenced by their own reporting of the repression: "Although it is quite true that the guerrilla focos... have been disbanded, that does not mean that the revolutionary war in Peru is over.