Egypto-centrism in Israeli Strategic Planning: The "Peace for Galilee" Operation

Abstract

At is crucial to understand the strategic motives behind Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon before one judges it a success or failure. The "Peace for Galilee" operation has been interpreted by some as a war designed solely to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (plo), concluding that the price paid was greater than the benefits reaped.1 Others have maintained the view that the 1982 war had an internal focus as well: to subdue the West Bank and to bring peace to Galilee.2 The latter was a very important consideration in going to war, but the former, though still a factor, appears to have been important only to a few in the Israeli government. In fact, the Israeli government is inclined to overestimate the plo's threat to its hold on the West Bank. Yet another interpretation of the 1982 invasion contends that "Peace for Galilee" grew out of Israel's strategic perceptions of Lebanon.3 Nevertheless, there is ample reason to conclude that the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was an application of comprehensive Israeli security concerns extant since the State of Israel's creation in 1948 and, therefore, should not be viewed as a limited application in Lebanon. Furthermore, the 1982 invasion was a result of doctrine dictated by those same concerns that began to affect Lebanon directly as early as 1963. Israeli-Egyptian relations have always been at the core of Israeli strategic thinking. Consequently, Israeli strategy toward Lebanon has been a function of these southern-oriented considerations. The strategic