Information systems project escalation: a reinterpretation based on options theory

Mark Keil , Jerry Flatto
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引用次数: 50

Abstract

Escalation of commitment is a well-known phenomenon whereby individuals and organizations continue to invest in what appear to be losing courses of action. Traditional theories of escalation implicitly assume the phenomenon is dysfunctional and results from flawed, or irrational, decision-making. Some have argued, however, that the phenomenon results from equivocal information concerning a particular course of action and does not necessarily represent a flawed or irrational decision process. To shed light on this distinction, we examine prior theories of escalation and introduce a reinterpretation of the phenomenon based on options theory.

To provide a context for our discussion, we examine information systems (IS) project escalation. While escalation is a general phenomenon, IS investments represent a particularly appealing context of study for several reasons. First, investments in information technology represent a significant and growing fraction of total capital expenditures for most organizations. Second, IS projects exhibit certain characteristics which create ambiguity and may cause them to be especially susceptible to escalation.

Our analysis suggests that traditional theories of escalation behavior give an incomplete picture because they do not provide a mechanism for distinguishing warranted from unwarranted escalation. Thus, traditional theories provide little explanation for those situations in which escalation behavior is economically prudent. Failure to consider the value of real options means that the perceived benefits of a project are lower than the actual benefits, meaning that managers are apt to reject or prematurely cancel projects that would in fact be economically beneficial to pursue.

This paper applies options theory to show that some projects that might otherwise be viewed as cases of unwarranted escalation, actually involve situations in which escalation is warranted. The options theory perspective offers new theoretical insights that challenge the traditional assumptions and yet complement existing theories regarding escalation behavior.

信息系统项目升级:基于期权理论的再解释
承诺升级是一种众所周知的现象,即个人和组织继续投资于似乎正在失去的行动方案。传统的升级理论隐含地假设这种现象是功能失调的,是有缺陷或不合理决策的结果。然而,一些人认为,这种现象是由于有关特定行动过程的模棱两可的信息造成的,并不一定代表有缺陷或不合理的决策过程。为了阐明这一区别,我们检查了先前的升级理论,并介绍了基于期权理论的现象的重新解释。为了给我们的讨论提供一个背景,我们检查信息系统(IS)项目升级。虽然升级是一种普遍现象,但出于几个原因,is投资代表了一个特别有吸引力的研究背景。首先,对信息技术的投资在大多数组织的总资本支出中占了很大的比例,而且还在不断增长。其次,伊斯兰国项目具有某些特点,这些特点会产生模糊性,并可能导致它们特别容易升级。我们的分析表明,传统的升级行为理论给出了一个不完整的图景,因为它们没有提供一种机制来区分有根据的升级和无根据的升级。因此,传统理论对那些升级行为在经济上是谨慎的情况提供了很少的解释。不考虑实物期权的价值意味着项目的预期收益低于实际收益,这意味着管理者倾向于拒绝或过早地取消实际上具有经济效益的项目。本文运用期权理论来表明,一些项目,否则可能被视为不合理的升级的情况下,实际上涉及的情况下,升级是必要的。期权理论的观点提供了新的理论见解,挑战了传统的假设,但补充了现有的理论升级行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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