The Quiet‐Loud‐Quiet Politics of Post‐Crisis Consumer Bankruptcy Law: The Case of Ireland and the Troika

Abstract

A decade after the Global Financial Crisis, many developed economies continue to strain under excessive household debt. This article presents evidence suggesting that the failure of policymakers to enact debt relief measures may lie in the superior influence of the coordinated and concentrated financial sector over legislative processes as compared to the diffuse and disorganised interests of consumer debtors. Post-crisis popular interest in technical issues of personal insolvency law created only a narrow space of political opportunity. Soon these questions returned to the domain of technocratic actors and corporate influence. The article examines this situation through an inter-disciplinary case study of consumer bankruptcy reform in Ireland under ‘Troika’ supervision. Proposals initially billed as assisting over-indebted households developed into increasingly creditor-friendly legislation in ‘quieter’ stages of technocratic decision-making. The stark implications of these findings highlight obstacles to resolving household debt problems and consequent risks of economic and political instability