Like father, like son: Who creates listed subsidiaries?

IF 2.6 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Hichem Boulifa , Konari Uchida
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Equity carve-outs and spin-offs generate listed subsidiaries that embrace conflicts of interests between controlling and minority shareholders. We find robust evidence that long-tenure managers tend to conduct these asset divestitures, especially when the divesting firm has a concentrated ownership structure. The result suggests that managers with the opportunity to extract private benefits establish entities that provide such opportunities. Meanwhile, large shareholders prevent managers from conducting these divestitures when they have sufficiently large cash flow rights. We find no evidence that firms launching listed subsidiaries achieve better financial outcomes than asset sell-off firms. Problematic entities in corporate governance further create such entities.

有其父必有其子:谁创建上市子公司?
股权分拆和分拆产生的上市子公司包含控股股东和少数股东之间的利益冲突。我们发现强有力的证据表明,长期经理倾向于进行这些资产剥离,特别是当剥离公司具有集中的所有权结构时。结果表明,有机会获取私人利益的管理者建立了提供这种机会的实体。与此同时,当大股东拥有足够大的现金流权利时,他们会阻止管理者进行这些资产剥离。我们没有发现任何证据表明,推出上市子公司的公司比资产出售公司的财务结果更好。公司治理中存在问题的实体进一步催生了这样的实体。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
6.90%
发文量
36
期刊介绍: The Journal of the Japanese and International Economies publishes original reports of research devoted to academic analyses of the Japanese economy and its interdependence on other national economies. The Journal also features articles that present related theoretical, empirical, and comparative analyses with their policy implications. Book reviews are also published.
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