Who's Afraid of Sunlight? Explaining Opposition to Transparency in Economic Development

IF 1.4 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Nathan M. Jensen, Calvin Thrall
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Abstract Firms and governments often negotiate economic development deals, such as tax abatements, with limited transparency, using exceptions to public records laws or other strategies for nondisclosure. In this article we explore the motivations of firms for keeping economic development deals out of the public eye. We explore legal challenges to public records requests for deal-specific, company-specific participation in a state economic development incentive program. By examining applications for participation in a major state economic program, the Texas Enterprise Fund, we find that a company is more likely to challenge a formal public records request if it has renegotiated the terms of the award to reduce its job-creation obligations. We interpret this as companies challenging transparency when they have avoided being penalized for noncompliance by engaging in nonpublic renegotiations. These results provide evidence regarding those conditions that prompt firms to challenge transparency and illustrate some of the limitations of safeguards such as clawbacks (or incentive-recapture provisions) when such reforms aren't coupled with robust transparency mechanisms. We speculate that the main motivation for these challenges is to limit scrutiny of these deals that could lead to backlashes against future economic development agreements.
谁害怕阳光?解释经济发展中对透明度的反对
企业和政府经常在有限的透明度下谈判经济发展协议,比如减税,利用公共记录法的例外或其他不披露策略。在本文中,我们探讨了企业将经济发展交易置于公众视线之外的动机。我们将探讨针对特定交易、特定公司参与国家经济发展激励计划的公共记录请求的法律挑战。通过审查参与德州企业基金(Texas Enterprise Fund)这一重大州经济项目的申请,我们发现,如果一家公司重新协商了奖励条款,以减少其创造就业的义务,那么它更有可能挑战正式的公共记录请求。我们将此解释为,当公司通过非公开的重新谈判避免因违规而受到惩罚时,它们对透明度提出了挑战。这些结果为促使企业挑战透明度的条件提供了证据,并说明了在这些改革没有与健全的透明度机制相结合的情况下,追回(或激励-重新获得条款)等保障措施的一些局限性。我们推测,这些挑战的主要动机是限制对这些交易的审查,否则可能导致对未来经济发展协议的反弹。
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来源期刊
Business and Politics
Business and Politics Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
16.70%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: Business and Politics solicits articles within the broad area of the interaction between firms and political actors. Two specific areas are of particular interest to the journal. The first concerns the use of non-market corporate strategy. These efforts include internal organizational design decisions as well as external strategies. Internal organizational design refers to management structure, sourcing decisions, and transnational organization with respect to the firm"s non-market environment. External strategies include legal tactics, testimony, lobbying and other means to influence policy makers at all levels of government and international institutions as an adjunct to market strategies of the firm.
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