Plato and Antisthenes in the Phaedo: A Reflexive Reading. Part Two

Q4 Arts and Humanities
Peitho Pub Date : 2020-12-23 DOI:10.14746/pea.2020.1.2
Giuseppe Mazzara
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine that to which Plato alludes. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is histori­cally very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing the Phaedo: a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo, given that the latter work in all prob­ability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study is divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced, given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immor­tality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attrib­utes, the differences and their opposites, and the opposites of opposites.
柏拉图和安提斯尼在《斐多篇:反思性阅读》中。第二部分
这项研究的目的不是要显示安提斯尼在对话中的存在,而是要检验柏拉图所暗示的。两位苏格拉底之间关于思想的争论在历史上得到了充分的证明,正如在克拉提勒斯中已经看到的那样。因此,我们有理由认为,当柏拉图写斐多篇时,这场争论一定影响了他:在这场对话中,思想和他的新逻辑的重要性是不可否认的。因此,本文将研究以下问题:考虑到后者在Sathōn之前的所有概率性中工作,安提斯尼的命名和确定逻辑对斐多篇中提出的同样命名和确定逻辑有什么影响?根据对话中所说的内容,答案主要集中在不会说的内容上。因此,本研究分为两部分:第一部分展示了所谓的“第二次导航”是如何作为对生理学家给出的反应不足的反对而出现的。引人注目的是,某些“共同意见”被认为是令人困惑的,持有这些意见的个人被认为是不确定的,正如所争论的那样,这一定包括安提斯尼。实际上,Tht. 108c7-8报告说,后者把共同的意见作为他的分母逻辑的基石。另一方面,第二部分致力于检验所谓的“最终论证”。在这里,安提斯尼的存在似乎更微妙,考虑到他对不可逆对立的新逻辑的不完全了解,这是柏拉图为了证明灵魂的不朽和不可摧毁性而提出的。另一方面,安提斯尼很可能促使柏拉图在定义逻辑中明确概念与事物之间的关系,因为“异理理”理论的支持者拒绝区分实体及其属性,差异及其对立面,以及对立面的对立面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Peitho
Peitho Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
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