The Effect of Civilian Oversight on Police Organizational Performance: A Quasi-Experimental Study

Jisang Kim
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Although civilian oversight has been introduced to make the police accountable to citizens and perform better, its effectiveness has not been thoroughly investigated yet. To better understand civilian oversight of the police, this study explores its theoretical basis as an accountability mechanism and suggests how it holds police agencies accountable even without direct disciplinary authority. The data from Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) program, and the Fatal Encounters (FE) database are analyzed to estimate the effect of civilian oversight on police organizational performance, using a propensity score matching analysis. Among the dependent variables included in the analysis as performance indicators, civilian oversight turns out to have a significant influence only on police agencies’ clearance rates. The police agencies with civilian oversight have lower clearance rates by 2.71 percentage points on average compared to those without civilian oversight. The implications of civilian oversight's negative impact on police organizational performance are further discussed.
民间监督对警察组织绩效的影响:一项准实验研究
虽然引入了民事监督,以使警察对公民负责并更好地执行任务,但其有效性尚未得到彻底调查。为了更好地理解平民对警察的监督,本研究探讨了其作为问责机制的理论基础,并提出了如何在没有直接纪律授权的情况下对警察机构进行问责。本文分析了执法管理和行政统计(LEMAS)调查、统一犯罪报告(UCR)项目和致命遭遇(FE)数据库的数据,利用倾向得分匹配分析来估计民事监督对警察组织绩效的影响。在作为绩效指标纳入分析的因变量中,民事监督结果仅对警察机构的破案率产生重大影响。有民间监督的警察机关破案率比没有民间监督的警察机关平均低2.71个百分点。进一步讨论了文职监督对警察组织绩效的负面影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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