{"title":"Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind Pres. Obama's Immigration Actions","authors":"Michael Kagan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2650558","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"President Obama’s ambitious use of executive discretion in immigration – especially the DACA and DAPA programs – should be understood in context of a struggle within the executive branch between the President and frontline enforcement officers in the Department of Homeland Security who have actively resisted his policy agenda. The so far successful litigation by 26 states to partially halt these programs has focused on this struggle within the executive branch, rather than on the stalemate between the President and Congress over legislative immigration reform. In preliminary rulings, the federal district court and the Court of Appeals have interpreted ambiguous provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to require a cumbersome notice and comment process in order for the President and the heads of immigration enforcement agencies to provide binding instructions to frontline enforcement officers about how to exercise discretion in individual cases. This article argues that interpreting the APA in this manner is unnecessary and thwarts the ability of elected leaders to direct the operations of government, and thus insulates law enforcement from change through the democratic process. Prosecutorial discretion requires judgment calls, and these decisions should be made as much as possible in a manner that renders them accountable to voters. To illustrate the need for elected officials to be able to direct their subordinates, this article draws analogies to conservative critiques of public sector unions, and to First Amendment case law involving public employees.","PeriodicalId":83423,"journal":{"name":"University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond","volume":"26 1","pages":"665-736"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2650558","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
President Obama’s ambitious use of executive discretion in immigration – especially the DACA and DAPA programs – should be understood in context of a struggle within the executive branch between the President and frontline enforcement officers in the Department of Homeland Security who have actively resisted his policy agenda. The so far successful litigation by 26 states to partially halt these programs has focused on this struggle within the executive branch, rather than on the stalemate between the President and Congress over legislative immigration reform. In preliminary rulings, the federal district court and the Court of Appeals have interpreted ambiguous provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to require a cumbersome notice and comment process in order for the President and the heads of immigration enforcement agencies to provide binding instructions to frontline enforcement officers about how to exercise discretion in individual cases. This article argues that interpreting the APA in this manner is unnecessary and thwarts the ability of elected leaders to direct the operations of government, and thus insulates law enforcement from change through the democratic process. Prosecutorial discretion requires judgment calls, and these decisions should be made as much as possible in a manner that renders them accountable to voters. To illustrate the need for elected officials to be able to direct their subordinates, this article draws analogies to conservative critiques of public sector unions, and to First Amendment case law involving public employees.
奥巴马总统在移民问题上——尤其是DACA和DAPA项目上——雄心勃勃地使用行政自由裁量权,应该放在总统与国土安全部(Department of Homeland Security)一线执法官员之间的斗争背景中来理解,后者积极抵制他的政策议程。到目前为止,26个州成功地要求部分停止这些项目的诉讼集中在行政部门内部的斗争上,而不是总统和国会之间在移民立法改革上的僵局。在初步裁决中,联邦地区法院和上诉法院对《行政程序法》中模棱两可的条款进行了解释,要求通过繁琐的通知和评论程序,以便总统和移民执法机构负责人向一线执法人员提供有约束力的指示,说明如何在个别案件中行使自由裁量权。本文认为,以这种方式解释《行政程序法》是不必要的,它阻碍了民选领导人指导政府运作的能力,从而使执法部门与民主进程中的变革隔绝开来。检察官的自由裁量权需要作出判断,这些决定应尽可能以对选民负责的方式作出。为了说明民选官员能够指导其下属的必要性,本文将其与保守派对公共部门工会的批评以及涉及公共雇员的第一修正案判例法进行了类比。