The Political Economy of International Regulatory Cooperation

IF 10.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
G. Maggi, Ralph Ossa
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

We examine international regulatory agreements that are negotiated under lobbying pressures from producer groups. The way in which lobbying influences the cooperative setting of regulatory policies, as well as the welfare impacts of international agreements, depend crucially on whether the interests of producers in different countries are aligned or in conflict. The former situation tends to occur for product standards, while the latter tends to occur for process standards. We find that, if producer lobbies are strong enough, agreements on product standards lead to excessive deregulation and decrease welfare, while agreements on process standards tighten regulations and enhance welfare. (JEL F13, F14, F15, L15, L51)
国际规制合作的政治经济学
我们研究了在生产商团体的游说压力下谈判达成的国际监管协议。游说如何影响监管政策的合作制定,以及国际协议对福利的影响,关键取决于不同国家生产者的利益是一致的还是相互冲突的。产品标准多出现前一种情况,工艺标准多出现后一种情况。我们发现,如果生产者游说团体足够强大,产品标准协议会导致过度放松管制并降低福利,而过程标准协议会收紧监管并提高福利。(jel f13, f14, f15, l15, l51)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
18.60
自引率
2.80%
发文量
122
期刊介绍: The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.
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