Does it Pay to Have CIOs on the Board? Creating Value by Appointing C-Level IT Executives to the Board of Directors

IF 7 3区 管理学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
N. Bandodkar, V. Grover
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

In an increasingly digital world, C-level information technology experts (CITEs) such as CIOs and CTOs are playing an increasingly indispensable role in leading IT initiatives. Despite this, recent research shows a lack of oversight by the board of directors over the IT function due to the “IT confidence gap” of directors with no IT expertise. This has resulted in the emergence of a recent trend of appointing CITEs to the board of directors. However, there is little research on whether such appointments result in value creation for the appointing firms. We use perspectives from agency and resource dependence theories to examine two value impacts of CITE director appointments to address this question. We suggest that CITE director appointments create signaling value by enhancing the firm’s ability to signal their intention to institute more effective oversight of the IT function and subsequently accumulate value in the form of share price reaction to appointment announcements. Correspondingly, CITE directors’ human and relational capital application also creates substantive value in the form of firm financial performance over a longer duration. Using an event study and hierarchical linear modeling, our analysis of 334 CITE director appointments largely supports our contention that the human and relational capital of CITE directors and their appointment in firms facing IT-related contextual conditions results in both a positive share price reaction and better firm financial performance over the long term. We conclude that appointing CITE directors with the appropriate capital under certain contextual conditions leads to firm value creation.
董事会里有首席信息官值得吗?通过任命c级IT主管进入董事会创造价值
在日益数字化的世界中,首席信息官和首席技术官等c级信息技术专家在领导IT计划方面发挥着越来越不可或缺的作用。尽管如此,最近的研究表明,由于没有IT专业知识的董事存在“IT信心差距”,董事会对IT职能缺乏监督。这导致最近出现了任命CITEs进入董事会的趋势。然而,关于这种任命是否会为任命公司创造价值的研究却很少。本文运用代理理论和资源依赖理论的视角,考察了上市公司董事任命的两种价值影响。我们认为,CITE董事任命通过增强公司的能力来创造信号价值,从而表明他们有意对IT职能进行更有效的监督,并随后以股价对任命公告的反应的形式积累价值。相应地,CITE董事的人力资本和关系资本应用也在较长时间内以公司财务绩效的形式创造了实质性价值。利用事件研究和层次线性模型,我们对334名CITE董事任命的分析在很大程度上支持了我们的论点,即在面临it相关背景条件的公司中,CITE董事的人力资本和关系资本及其任命既会带来积极的股价反应,也会带来更好的长期财务业绩。我们的结论是,在一定的背景条件下,任命具有适当资本的董事会导致公司价值创造。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of the Association for Information Systems
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 工程技术-计算机:信息系统
CiteScore
11.20
自引率
5.20%
发文量
33
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: The Journal of the Association for Information Systems (JAIS), the flagship journal of the Association for Information Systems, publishes the highest quality scholarship in the field of information systems. It is inclusive in topics, level and unit of analysis, theory, method and philosophical and research approach, reflecting all aspects of Information Systems globally. The Journal promotes innovative, interesting and rigorously developed conceptual and empirical contributions and encourages theory based multi- or inter-disciplinary research.
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