Managing Consumer Referrals on a Chain Network

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2014-03-17 DOI:10.1515/rne-2014-0002

Maria N. Arbatskaya, Hideo Konishi

引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract We consider a monopoly that sets a price and differentiated referral fees to spread product information along a simple consumer communication network (a chain). The profit-maximizing solution involves standard monopoly pricing and referral fees that provide consumers with strictly positive referral incentives. Effective price discrimination among consumers based on their positions in the chain occurs both in the case of differentiated referral fees and in the case of uniform referral fees.

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管理连锁网络中的消费者推荐

摘要本文考虑一个垄断企业，该企业通过设定价格和差异化推荐费，在一个简单的消费者沟通网络(链)上传播产品信息。利润最大化的解决方案包括标准的垄断定价和推荐费，为消费者提供严格的正向推荐激励。在差别推荐费和统一推荐费的情况下，消费者之间根据其在链条中的位置存在有效的价格歧视。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Network Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Network Economics seeks to help policy makers, academics, and practitioners keep informed of new research and policy debate in network economics and related subjects that are relevant to the study of network industries. By publishing high quality research on topical issues relevant to network industries, it is hoped readers will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the economic issues involved and that this will improve the quality of decision making by private and public organisations, and debate among researchers. The articles can cover specific network industries, or may deal with general issues that have relevance to a number of different network industries, including topics in the economics of networks, regulation, competition law, or industrial organisation. Papers that provide insights into policy debates are especially welcome, as are up-to-date surveys, book reviews, and comments.