Research on Evolutionary Game of Blockchain Enabling Finance-Transportation and Warehouse Financing

Abstract

Based on the financing business of the finance-transportation and warehouse (FTW) enabled by blockchain, this paper takes the two default modes of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), unilateral default and collusion default as the entry point, and constructs an evolutionary game (EG) model between the key players, financial institutions (FIs) and SMEs of the FTW before and after the introduction of blockchain technology (BT), and compares and discusses the evolution of the game system before and after the introduction of BT. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out. The findings are as follows: (1) The blockchain enabled FTW financing mode can effectively prevent the default behavior of SMEs. (2) BT can supervise the default behaviors of SMEs through strict regulatory environment formed by high default costs. (3) The increase of inventory pledge loan rate and FTW financing loan rate can accelerate the evolution of FIs to the loan stability strategy; The greater the return rate of production and the fraud cost of colluding to defraud the loan, the more the FIs and SMEs will be encouraged to choose the active financing strategy; The increase in the probability of conspiracy to cheat loans will shorten the time for SMEs to evolve the strategy of keeping contracts, and increase the time for FIs to evolve the strategy of lending.