France and European Security after the INF Treaty

Abstract

-Cor the second time in this decade, Europe must sort itself out in the wake of a "Euromissile crisis." This time, the question is not whether to accept deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons — their successful and peaceful installation ended that discussion — but what their removal will mean and how best to respond to it. The Reagan-Gorbachev INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) agreement last December is rightly being seen as a turning point in Western Europe's postwar defense narrative, and policymakers across the Continent are asking what this treaty, and the trends it symbolizes, means for the security of their countries. Nowhere is reappraisal more serious or more consequential than in France, where the degree of high-level and public debate, diplomacy, and military handwringing in the wake of recent developments has been considerable. Even in a country known for its defense "consensus" and its stubborn clinging to General Charles de Gaulle's military policies, the changing security environment has led to anything but continuity. Instead, France has begun to reexamine and even revise existing policies, to consider, enhance, or create alliances with different European partners, and to study military options more closely than ever. The main focus of these deliberations has been, not surprisingly, the role France can and should play in a West European defense that is more independent from the United States. Since the Reagan administration first began seriously courting its Kremlin counterpart late last year, leaders in Paris have begun to take note of other ominous signs that the U.S. contribution to European security cannot be taken for granted. Even though many observers, in France as elsewhere, have long