Homo Comparativus

Abstract

This chapter proposes the replacement of the idea of homo economicus as the ontologically fundamental unit of social science with the idea of homo comparativus. It explains the claim that reality can be perceived only through evaluative comparisons, eroding the traditional distinction between description and evaluation. The chapter also discusses and criticizes other philosophical approaches that put symbolic values similar to reputation at the center of the analysis of human action, including the economy of esteem defended by Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit and Anthony Appiah's theory of honor. Honoring others is always a double-edged sword. Acts of deference signal something about both those who defer and those to whom deference is paid. This chapter talks about the measure of social consensus on the practices and norms of according esteem if people are to strike a proper balance between the need to satisfy personal preferences when granting respect to others and the demands of social conformity that drives people to recognize others in order to make themselves more “acceptable” to the peer group to which they belong.