Leadership vacuum and urban economic development: Evidence from a transition country

IF 2.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Maoyong Cheng , Yutong Yao , Justin Y. Jin , Khalid Nainar , Yu Meng
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study focuses on the impact of municipal government officials’ vacancies on the economic development of their cities. Using manually collected data on unfilled senior governmental positions measured by the absence of municipal party secretaries in China from 2003 to 2019, we find that these absences limit city economic development. We identify two possible channels through which this happens: government efficiency and economic policy uncertainty. Finally, we show that the impact of these vacancies on city economic development is stronger in cities in which there is greater pressure to promote government officials and in less developed cities. Thus, this study offers new evidence that vacancies in city government undermine that city's economic development, particularly in a country undergoing an economic transition.

领导真空与城市经济发展:来自转型国家的证据
本研究关注市政府官员缺位对其所在城市经济发展的影响。利用人工收集的 2003 年至 2019 年中国以市委书记缺位衡量的政府高级职位空缺数据,我们发现这些缺位限制了城市的经济发展。我们发现了两种可能的渠道:政府效率和经济政策的不确定性。最后,我们表明,在政府官员晋升压力较大的城市和欠发达城市,这些职位空缺对城市经济发展的影响更大。因此,本研究提供了新的证据,证明城市政府职位空缺会损害该城市的经济发展,尤其是在经济转型国家。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
66
审稿时长
45 days
期刊介绍: The mission of the Journal of Comparative Economics is to lead the new orientations of research in comparative economics. Before 1989, the core of comparative economics was the comparison of economic systems with in particular the economic analysis of socialism in its different forms. In the last fifteen years, the main focus of interest of comparative economists has been the transition from socialism to capitalism.
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