Maoyong Cheng , Yutong Yao , Justin Y. Jin , Khalid Nainar , Yu Meng
{"title":"Leadership vacuum and urban economic development: Evidence from a transition country","authors":"Maoyong Cheng , Yutong Yao , Justin Y. Jin , Khalid Nainar , Yu Meng","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2023.08.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study focuses on the impact of municipal government officials’ vacancies on the economic development of their cities. Using manually collected data on unfilled senior governmental positions measured by the absence of municipal party secretaries in China from 2003 to 2019, we find that these absences limit city economic development. We identify two possible channels through which this happens: government efficiency and economic policy uncertainty. Finally, we show that the impact of these vacancies on city economic development is stronger in cities in which there is greater pressure to promote government officials and in less developed cities. Thus, this study offers new evidence that vacancies in city government undermine that city's economic development, particularly in a country undergoing an economic transition.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596723000707/pdfft?md5=bcb07329f1d5fcb48983c25ebbd7faf6&pid=1-s2.0-S0147596723000707-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Comparative Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596723000707","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study focuses on the impact of municipal government officials’ vacancies on the economic development of their cities. Using manually collected data on unfilled senior governmental positions measured by the absence of municipal party secretaries in China from 2003 to 2019, we find that these absences limit city economic development. We identify two possible channels through which this happens: government efficiency and economic policy uncertainty. Finally, we show that the impact of these vacancies on city economic development is stronger in cities in which there is greater pressure to promote government officials and in less developed cities. Thus, this study offers new evidence that vacancies in city government undermine that city's economic development, particularly in a country undergoing an economic transition.
期刊介绍:
The mission of the Journal of Comparative Economics is to lead the new orientations of research in comparative economics. Before 1989, the core of comparative economics was the comparison of economic systems with in particular the economic analysis of socialism in its different forms. In the last fifteen years, the main focus of interest of comparative economists has been the transition from socialism to capitalism.