{"title":"Homophily in Indian Social Networks: A Model of Signed Network Formation","authors":"S. Pandey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3313404","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores possible theoretical underpinnings for homophily in signed social networks, particularly in the Indian context. The model of signed network formation proposed here considers a population which is divided into communities or identity groups that are hierarchically arranged in terms of social power and ownership/control of social resources. An agent's \"intrinsic strength\" refers to their control over resources by virtue of belonging to a community. This, along with the intrinsic strengths of one's positively tied neighbours, determines an agent's \"coercive power\". The structure of inter and intra community ties is studied in Nash equilibria in a setting where agents extract payoffs from their negatively tied neighbours with lower coercive power.","PeriodicalId":85135,"journal":{"name":"Media development","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Media development","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3313404","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper explores possible theoretical underpinnings for homophily in signed social networks, particularly in the Indian context. The model of signed network formation proposed here considers a population which is divided into communities or identity groups that are hierarchically arranged in terms of social power and ownership/control of social resources. An agent's "intrinsic strength" refers to their control over resources by virtue of belonging to a community. This, along with the intrinsic strengths of one's positively tied neighbours, determines an agent's "coercive power". The structure of inter and intra community ties is studied in Nash equilibria in a setting where agents extract payoffs from their negatively tied neighbours with lower coercive power.