The Trade-Offs of Counterterrorism Policies

Abstract

This article provides a modern overview of counterterrorism tools and their trade-offs for curbing terrorist attacks and their consequences. Defensive and proactive countermeasures constitute two main classes of counterterror tools deployed by targeted governments. The primary drawback of defensive actions, which make terrorist attacks more costly and less apt to succeed, is attack transference that shifts the mode, venue, or target of attacks to those less protected. In contrast, offensive proactive measures, which confront the terrorists directly, may result in backlash as terrorist sympathizers, the public, and state sponsors augment their terrorist support resulting in more recruitment and attacks. Other essential trade-offs are identified and discussed. Additionally, we formulate a two-stage canonical game-theoretic model involving a targeted government and a terrorist group adversary. This model accounts for defensive and proactive policies but also myriad scenarios. As such, it serves as a foundation to explain the modern counterterrorism literature as illustrated by a discussion of iconic contributions to the study of counterterrorism. JEL