Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20220357

T. Brzustowski, Alkis Georgiadis-Harris, Balázs Szentes

引用次数: 4

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer’s valuation is binary and his private information. The seller has access to dynamic contracts and, in each period, decides whether to deploy the previous period’s contract or to replace it with a new one. The main result of the paper is that the Coase conjecture fails: the monopo-list’s payoff is bounded away from the low valuation irrespective of the discount factor. (JEL D42, D82, D86, L12)

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智能合约和科斯猜想

本文重新考虑了不能作出跨期承诺的持久利益垄断者的问题。买方的估价是二元的，而且是他的私人信息。卖方可以访问动态合同，并在每个时期决定是否部署前一时期的合同或用新合同替换它。本文的主要结论是，科斯猜想不成立:不管贴现系数如何，垄断者的收益都与低估值有界限。(凝胶d42, d82, d86, 12)

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.