The moral role differentiation of experimental psychologists

Abstract

This essay asks whether the discipline of experimental psychology is morally role differentiated; whether, that is, the social functions or contributions of that discipline give rise to special norms which allow experimental psychologists to weight some moral considerations less heavily than would be required in everyday situations. This question is important to experimental psychology because of the large number of research procedures which clearly would be immoral if carried out by the non-professional.

The essay shows that any claim to moral role differentiation for the discipline must involve proposing first that the results of psychological experimentation are of great value to furthering human welfare (this claim is not disputed in the essay), and second that these general benefits override the specific harms or disutilities caused to the subjects of particular experiments. The essay argues that in most cases experimenters can roughly calculate utilities arising from individual experiments so cannot appeal to the general benefits of research to excuse themselves from ordinary moral considerations in deciding whether to undertake particular experiments. The essay further argues that the utilitarian (cost-benefit) model itself must be modified by various considerations of human rights, which lay even more stringent moral consideration upon the psychologist. Accordingly, experimental psychology is only very weakly morally role differentiated. This result, however, does not significantly undercut psychological research, for most experimental procedures can be modified to conform with the relevant moral consideration. Further, a proper consideration of the rights model shows that many of the current concerns about obtaining informed consent are misplaced and put morally unnecessary burdens upon the experimental psychologist.