Stackelberg game model of green tourism supply chain with governmental subsidy

IF 1.1 4区 计算机科学 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Ruiyou Zhang, Zhiyou Li
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract Green tourism has become a hot issue in both academic fields and companies recently. A green tourism supply chain composed of a government, a green scenic area and a travel agency is addressed using the game theory. The scenic area in the supply chain sells tickets to tourists through the travel agency, and makes extra investment on environmental protection to improve its green degree. The government provides financial subsidy to the green scenic area maximizing both the total social welfare and environmental improvements. Two Stackelberg game models of the green tourism supply chain, without and with the governmental subsidy, are built and solved by the backward induction method. The theoretical analyses indicate that the governmental subsidy can increase the demand of green tourism, and enhance the total social welfare and environmental protection level of the whole supply chain.
考虑政府补贴的绿色旅游供应链Stackelberg博弈模型
摘要近年来,绿色旅游已成为学术界和企业界关注的热点问题。运用博弈论的方法研究了由政府、绿色景区和旅行社组成的绿色旅游供应链。供应链上的景区通过旅行社向游客销售门票,并在环保方面进行额外投资,提高绿色程度。政府对绿色景区给予财政补贴,使社会总福利和环境改善最大化。建立了无政府补贴和有政府补贴两种绿色旅游供应链的Stackelberg博弈模型,并采用逆向归纳法求解。理论分析表明,政府补贴可以增加绿色旅游的需求,提高整个供应链的社会总福利和环境保护水平。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Infor
Infor 管理科学-计算机:信息系统
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
16
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: INFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research is published and sponsored by the Canadian Operational Research Society. It provides its readers with papers on a powerful combination of subjects: Information Systems and Operational Research. The importance of combining IS and OR in one journal is that both aim to expand quantitative scientific approaches to management. With this integration, the theory, methodology, and practice of OR and IS are thoroughly examined. INFOR is available in print and online.
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