Rent-seeking Practices in the Housing Development Approval Process

IF 0.3 Q3 AREA STUDIES
Abdul-Rashid Abdul-Aziz, Suhaila Ali
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The lengthy, uncertain and onerous planning approval process in various countries around the world has prompted frustrated housing developers to seek influence by paying off approving officials. A research was conducted in Malaysia to investigate in greater detail this rent-seeking phenomenon by asking six fundamental questions. Rich data were obtained by interviewing 22 housing developers and consultants who work for them. Developers engage in rent-seeking behaviours to overcome genuine and artificial hurdles when applying for development approval. All approving agencies, though not all their staff, reciprocate to such behaviours. The monetary value of the payoffs depend on the rank of the public actor and project features. The higher the office holder is, the larger is the expected pay-off. Big and complex development projects in urban centres have a higher pay-off tag. Low value items television sets and car repairs serve to support normal lifestyle whereas high value items such as golfing and holiday trips support lavish lifestyle. Establishing good rapport is a prerequisite to the rent seeking and giving exchange. Elements which help foster reciprocity by state actors to housing developers’ rentseeking behaviours include low civil servant salary and high living cost, and weak punitive action. Common ethnicity facilitates nuanced communication by the latter, but common religion may dampen the former’s enthusiasm to accept any payoffs. Eventually house buyers and the general public are the casualties by virtue of higher house prices and substandard infrastructure. Given the combination of inherent features of the planning system and certain elements that impinge on state actors both of which promote rent-seeking practices, a realistic law enforcement solution is to prioritise illicit market-state exchanges involving grossly distorting rent extraction and pecuniary rewards of significant magnitude rather than total eradication of the practice.
房屋发展审批程序中的寻租行为
世界各国冗长、不确定和繁重的规划审批程序促使沮丧的房地产开发商绕过审批官员寻求影响力。在马来西亚进行了一项研究,通过提出六个基本问题来更详细地调查这种寻租现象。通过采访22家房地产开发商及其顾问,我们获得了丰富的数据。从事寻租行为的开发商在申请开发许可时克服了真实和人为的障碍。所有的审批机构,尽管不是所有的工作人员,都对这种行为报以回报。收益的货币价值取决于公共行为者的等级和项目的特点。职位越高,预期收益越大。在城市中心的大型复杂开发项目有更高的回报标签。低价值的东西,电视机和汽车修理,支持正常的生活方式,而高价值的东西,如高尔夫球和度假旅行,支持奢侈的生活方式。建立良好的关系是寻租交换的前提。促进国家行为体对住房开发商寻租行为的互惠性的因素包括公务员工资低、生活成本高、惩罚性措施弱。共同的种族有助于后者进行细致入微的交流,但共同的宗教可能会抑制前者接受任何回报的热情。最终,由于房价上涨和基础设施不达标,购房者和普通公众成为受害者。考虑到计划体系的内在特征和影响国家行为者的某些因素的结合,这两者都促进了寻租行为,一个现实的执法解决方案是优先考虑涉及严重扭曲的租金提取和巨额金钱奖励的非法市场国家交换,而不是彻底根除这种做法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Kajian Malaysia
Kajian Malaysia AREA STUDIES-
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
26
审稿时长
20 weeks
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