Fodor and demonstratives in LOT

IF 0.8 4区哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2020-02-26 DOI:10.1387/theoria.20906

Una Stojnić, E. Lepore

引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.

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LOT中的指示词和指示词

在本文中，我们将考虑在上次与Jerry Fodor的哲学对话中提出的关于思想语言中指示词的一系列困惑。我们反对福多提出的受卡普兰启发的索引解决方案，而是在我们对英语指示代词的说明的基础上，为思想语言中的指示代词提供一个福多友好的说明。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

16.70%

发文量

审稿时长

7 weeks

期刊介绍： THEORIA is open to original and relevant papers from any of the fields covered by the journal, i.e. logic and philosophy of logic, history and philosophy of mathematics, history and philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind and cognition. Articles in English and Spanish are preferred, but the journal also accepts articles written in any of the languages of the Iberian Peninsula.