Cognition, Technology, and Organizational Limits: Lessons from the Air France 447 Disaster

N. Oliver, T. Calvard, K. Potočnik
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引用次数: 46

Abstract

Organizations, particularly those for whom safety and reliability are crucial, develop routines to protect them from failure. But even highly reliable organizations are not immune to disaster and prolonged periods of safe operation are punctuated by occasional catastrophes. Scholars of safety science label this the “paradox of almost totally safe systems,” noting that systems that are very safe under normal conditions may be vulnerable under unusual ones. In this paper, we explain, develop, and apply the concept of “organizational limits” to this puzzle through an analysis of the loss of Air France 447. We show that an initial, relatively minor limit violation set in train a cascade of human and technological limit violations, with catastrophic consequences. Focusing on cockpit automation, we argue that the same measures that make a system safe and predictable may introduce restrictions on cognition, which over time, inhibit or erode the disturbance-handling capability of the actors involved. We also note...
认知、技术和组织限制:法航447空难的教训
组织,特别是那些对安全和可靠性至关重要的组织,制定了常规程序来保护他们免受故障的影响。但是,即使是高度可靠的组织也不能幸免于灾难,长时间的安全运行也会被偶尔的灾难所打断。安全科学学者将这种现象称为“几乎完全安全系统的悖论”,他们指出,在正常情况下非常安全的系统,在异常情况下可能会变得脆弱。在本文中,我们通过对法航447航班损失的分析,解释、发展并应用“组织限制”的概念来解决这个难题。我们表明,最初的、相对较小的极限违规引发了一连串的人类和技术极限违规,造成了灾难性的后果。专注于驾驶舱自动化,我们认为使系统安全和可预测的相同措施可能会引入对认知的限制,随着时间的推移,会抑制或侵蚀相关参与者的干扰处理能力。我们还注意到……
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