Co-Investments and Tacit Collusion in Regulated Network Industries: Experimental Evidence

IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
J. Krämer, I. Vogelsang
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引用次数: 32

Abstract

Abstract Several regulatory authorities have recently allowed competing network operators to co-invest in network infrastructure. With the use of a laboratory experiment, we investigate the impact of co-investments on competition in regulated network industries, particularly in comparison to unilateral and duplicate investments. Our main finding is that co-investment (i.e. cooperation at the infrastructure level) facilitates tacit collusion (i.e. cooperation at the retail level) significantly, which questions the positive evaluation of co-investments with respect to consumers’ surplus in the theoretical literature.
管制网络产业的共同投资与隐性串通:实验证据
一些监管机构最近允许相互竞争的网络运营商共同投资网络基础设施。通过实验室实验,我们研究了共同投资对受监管网络行业竞争的影响,特别是与单边和重复投资相比。我们的主要发现是,共同投资(即基础设施层面的合作)显著促进了隐性串通(即零售层面的合作),这质疑了理论文献中对共同投资相对于消费者剩余的积极评价。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
期刊介绍: The Review of Network Economics seeks to help policy makers, academics, and practitioners keep informed of new research and policy debate in network economics and related subjects that are relevant to the study of network industries. By publishing high quality research on topical issues relevant to network industries, it is hoped readers will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the economic issues involved and that this will improve the quality of decision making by private and public organisations, and debate among researchers. The articles can cover specific network industries, or may deal with general issues that have relevance to a number of different network industries, including topics in the economics of networks, regulation, competition law, or industrial organisation. Papers that provide insights into policy debates are especially welcome, as are up-to-date surveys, book reviews, and comments.
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