Flexible Institution Building in the International Anti-corruption Regime: Proposing a Transnational Asset Recovery Mechanism

IF 2.7 2区社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

American Journal of International Law Pub Date : 2023-10-30 DOI:10.1017/ajil.2023.32

Laurence R. Helfer, Cecily Rose, Rachel Brewster

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Abstract

Asset recovery is a fundamental principle of anti-corruption law, without which the financial damage from corruption cannot be repaired. Yet recovering assets is notoriously difficult and time-consuming, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption provides little technical or institutional support to facilitate such returns. To remedy this, we propose the creation of a transnational asset recovery mechanism that could provide myriad services to states upon request, including gathering and publishing information, providing technical assistance and capacity building, helping to conclude agreements on asset return, and monitoring returned funds. Theoretically, we introduce the concepts of customizability and selectability to explain why a flexible transnational asset recovery mechanism has advantages over more formal international institutions, such as an international anti-corruption court. These benefits include lower financial and political costs, enhanced adaptability, and a greater likelihood of enhancing interstate cooperation regarding asset returns.

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国际反腐败机制下的灵活制度建设:跨国资产追回机制的构想

资产追回是反腐败法的一项基本原则，没有资产追回，腐败造成的经济损失就无法修复。然而，追回资产是出了名的困难和耗时，而《联合国反腐败公约》(United Nations Convention Against Corruption)在促进此类返还方面几乎没有提供任何技术或制度支持。为解决这一问题，我们建议建立一个跨国资产追回机制，该机制可应各国要求提供多种服务，包括收集和发布信息、提供技术援助和能力建设、帮助达成资产返还协议、监督返还资金。从理论上讲，我们引入了可定制性和可选择性的概念来解释为什么灵活的跨国资产追回机制比更正式的国际机构(如国际反腐败法院)具有优势。这些好处包括降低财政和政治成本，增强适应性，以及在资产回报方面加强州际合作的可能性更大。

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来源期刊

American Journal of International Law Multiple-

CiteScore

3.50

自引率

16.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： AJIL is a leading peer-reviewed journal, published quarterly since 1907. It features articles, essays, editorial comments, current developments, and book reviews by pre-eminent scholars and practitioners from around the world addressing developments in public and private international law and foreign relations law. The Journal also contains analyses of decisions by national and international courts and tribunals as well as a section on contemporary U.S. practice in international law. AJIL and AJIL Unbound are indispensable for all professionals working in international law, economics, trade, and foreign affairs.