Climate change denial, freedom of speech and global justice

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS
Trygve Lavik
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

In this paper I claim that there are moral reasons for making climate denialism illegal . First I define climate denialism, and then I discuss its impact on society and its reception in the media.  I build my philosophical arguments mainly on John Stuart Mill and Thomas M. Scanlon.  According to Mill’s utilitarian justification of free speech, even untrue opinions are valuable in society’s pursuit of more truth. Consequently one might think that Mill’s philosophy would justify climate denialists’ right to free speech.  A major section of the paper argues against that view. The main arguments are: Climate denialism is not beneficial because its main goal is to produce doubt, and not truth. Climate denialism is not sincerely meant, which is a necessary condition for Mill to accept utterances. Climate denialists bring harm, by blocking necessary action on climate change.  Primarily they harm future generations and people in developing countries. Hence the case can be made in terms of global justice: Would future generations and people in developing countries support my claim? I think so, or so I argue. My argument from global justice is built on Scanlon’s distinction between the interests of participants, the interests of audiences, and the interests of bystanders.  The climate denialists have participant interests ‘in being able to call something to the attention of a wide audience’. Audience interests consist in ‘having access to expressions that we wish to hear or read, and even in being exposed to some degree to expressions we have not chosen’. Future generations and people in poor countries are bystanders to the climate debate. If the debate postpones necessary actions, it is the bystanders who must pay the price. I argue that bystanders’ costs outweigh participants’ and audiences’ interests, and that this is an argument for a statutory ban on climate denialism. Article first published online: 21 DEC 2015
否认气候变化、言论自由和全球正义
在本文中,我声称有道德上的原因使气候否认主义非法。首先,我定义了气候否认主义,然后讨论了它对社会的影响以及它在媒体中的接受程度。我的哲学论点主要建立在约翰·斯图亚特·密尔和托马斯·m·斯坎伦的基础上。根据密尔对言论自由的功利主义辩护,即使是不真实的观点在社会追求更多真理的过程中也是有价值的。因此,有人可能会认为密尔的哲学可以为否认气候变化的人的言论自由辩护。这篇文章的主要部分反驳了这种观点。主要的论点是:气候否认主义是无益的,因为它的主要目标是制造怀疑,而不是制造真相。气候否认的本意并不真诚,这是密尔接受言论的必要条件。否认气候变化的人阻碍了应对气候变化的必要行动,从而带来了危害。它们主要伤害的是发展中国家的子孙后代和人民。因此,这种情况可以从全球正义的角度来提出:发展中国家的子孙后代和人民会支持我的主张吗?我是这么认为的,或者说我是这么认为的。我关于全球正义的论点是建立在斯坎伦对参与者利益、观众利益和旁观者利益的区分之上的。否认气候变化的人对“能够引起广大观众的注意”有参与性的兴趣。观众的兴趣在于“能够接触到我们希望听到或读到的表达方式,甚至在某种程度上接触到我们没有选择的表达方式”。贫穷国家的子孙后代和人民是气候辩论的旁观者。如果辩论推迟了必要的行动,旁观者必须为此付出代价。我认为,旁观者的成本大于参与者和受众的利益,这是对气候否认主义的法定禁令的一个论据。文章首次在线发布:2015年12月21日
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Etikk I Praksis
Etikk I Praksis Multiple-
CiteScore
0.50
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16 weeks
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