The South China Sea Issue: Its Implications on South East Asian Security

Abstract

Although the Chinese government has a strong preference for bilateral diplomatic negotiations to resolve disputes, its status as a party to UNCLOS and its continuing failure to reach a settlement with the Philippines has exposed it to the risk of litigation. Additionally, if the arbitration goes forward, China may be at a disadvantage because several Chinese assertions about their South China Sea rights are not well supported in international law. China’s leaders may also have concerns about avoid nationalists who are sensitive to any perception that the government lost control of a high profile issue to a small Southeast Asian state and a Japanese judge. Nonetheless, now that the Chinese have rejected the process, the panel will proceed without them, providing a small “victory” for Manila and potentially swinging international public opinion toward the Philippines. China being an established regional power and aspiring global power would better show her generosity to take the countries in neighborhood in confidence. For this, resolving South China Sea issue by win-win strategy will be of great benifit for regional stability and security in South East Asian region. Background The South China Sea covers an area of sea of some 3.5 million square kilometers, semi-enclosed by Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. These six countries have overlapping claims to various maritime zones in this area and five of them (China, both the mainland and Taiwan; Vietnam; the Philippines; Malaysia and Brunei) claim territorial sovereignty over land features in the South China Sea. Early in the twentieth century, the geographical scope of the Chinese state’s dominion increasingly came to attract the attention of both cartographers and the government itself. In June 1933, Chinese government appointed a commission that was tasked with reviewing maps and atlases produced by private sources in China. This Review Commission of Maps for lands and water published in January 1935 a list of 132 names, both in English and Chinese, for Chinese islands and other insular features in the south China Sea, which included the Xiasha 46 Journal of International Affairs Vol. 1, No. 1, 2016 (paracel) Islands, Dongsha (pratas) Islands, Zhongsha, including Huangyan Island1 (Macclesfield Bank, including Scarborough Shoal), and Nansha (Spratly) Islands.2 There was no reaction from Vietnam or any other State, and the Chinese naval contingent was sent to the islands and erected stone markers of Young Xing (Woody) Island in the Xisha (pratas) islands and Taiping (Itu Aba) Island in the Nansha(Spa) Islands. Following further inspections and surveys, the Chinese government internally circulated an atlas in 1947, drawing an eleven-dash line to indicate the geographical Scope of its authority over the South China Sea, right down to the Zengmu Ansha, or James Shoal, at 30 58’ N, 1120 17’ E.1 In January 1948, the Chinese Ministry of Interior published the Map of Location of South China Sea Islands (Nan Hai Zhudao Weizhi Tu) with a U-shape intermittent line to indicate the traditional boundary of China’s territory in the South China Sea.2 In 1953, two dashes were removed from the eleven-dash line, leaving nine segments, and in the same year the new line made its first appearance in atlases produced on the mainland of China. It is a common view that tensions in the South China Sea began to emerge in the late 1960s as the potentials of oil and natural gas in this area came to be appreciated. In early 1949, news reports indicated that the Philippines, which gained independence in July 1946, began to show interest in the Nansha Island. In response to an inquiry by China referred to “China’s Tai Ping Island,” the Philippines explained that it was concerned only with protecting its fishermen in the waters adjacent to that island.3 The situation in the area changed quickly in the early 1970s. In July 1971, the Philippines declared possession of the Kalayaan (Spartly) Group.4 This declaration was followed by presidential Decree No. 1596, June 11, 1978. Over the years, countless statements have been made on the disputes between the Philippines and China. Their tension flared again in April 2012, when the Philippines sent a warship to the area of Scarborough shoal and according to the Philippines, it had found Chinese fishing vessels in there (which has been claimed by China as part of Zhongsha Islands) with illegal coral and fish.5 It was suggested that the Scarborough Shoal accident was regarded as turning point and “unhappy conclusion taught the Philippines two lessons about dispute resolution with China over South China Sea issues: first, it was assumed that superior power and will use it; and second, in the face of such power further negotiations over sovereignty and resource claims are fruitless unless power