Davidson on Truth

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY
B. Oprea
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Abstract

"Truth-conditional semantics is by far the best-known philosophical contribution of Donald Davidson. The main idea of this approach is to explain the concept of meaning by appeal to the concept of truth. Accordingly, we understand a sentence s of a natural language L, if and only if, we know its truth-conditions. Challenging in its nature, this proposal immediately caught the attention of the philosophical community, being equally appreciated and criticized. The aim of this paper is to argue that Davidson’s approach is too optimistic in its goals. In my view, truth-conditional semantics is unlikely to be the best way to shed light on the concept of meaning. By appealing to Tarski’s semantic conception of truth and assuming a primitive concept of truth, this perspective leaves too many questions unanswered and thus proves its limits. Keywords: Donald Davidson, meaning, truth, Truth-Conditional Semantics. "
戴维森谈真理
真-条件语义学是目前为止唐纳德·戴维森最著名的哲学贡献。这种方法的主要思想是通过诉诸真理的概念来解释意义的概念。因此,我们理解自然语言L的句子s,当且仅当我们知道它的真值条件。由于具有挑战性的性质,这一建议立即引起了哲学界的注意,受到了赞赏和批评。本文的目的是论证戴维森的方法在其目标上过于乐观。在我看来,真-条件语义学不太可能是阐明意义概念的最佳方式。由于诉诸于塔斯基的语义真理概念,并假设了一个原始的真理概念,这种观点留下了太多未解的问题,从而证明了它的局限性。关键词:唐纳德·戴维森,意义,真,真-条件语义
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