{"title":"'Under God,' the Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional Trivia","authors":"Steven G. Gey","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.337200","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit created a furor recently when it ruled that the inclusion of the words \"under God\" in the official Pledge of Allegiance violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Responses to this ruling by politicians, the press, and legal academics were overwhelmingly critical. The unifying theme of many of these responses is that the claim against the \"under God\" language in the Pledge is trivial and therefore not the proper basis for an Establishment Clause ruling. This Article uses the Pledge controversy as a vehicle for investigating the concept of constitutional trivia in the Establishment Clause context. There are two variations on the argument that the \"under God\" controversy is trivial. The first variation asserts that the religious component of the Pledge has so little religious significance that it does not rise to the level of an Establishment Clause violation. The second variation acknowledges the religious significance of the \"under God\" language, but asserts that trivial religious exercises should be considered permissible exceptions. to the normal First Amendment rules. The problem is that neither variation on the triviality defense of the Pledge can be reconciled with a plausible reading of the factual background of the Pledge statute, or with the overwhelming thrust of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause precedents. The triviality defense of the Pledge is therefore difficult to accept at face value. This defense should be viewed instead as a distorted reflection of the growing conflict over the most basic principle of Establishment Clause jurisprudence: Does the Constitution continue to mandate a secular government, or has the subtle sectarian dominance of government become an accepted constitutional fact?","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"81 1","pages":"1865"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"North Carolina law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.337200","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit created a furor recently when it ruled that the inclusion of the words "under God" in the official Pledge of Allegiance violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Responses to this ruling by politicians, the press, and legal academics were overwhelmingly critical. The unifying theme of many of these responses is that the claim against the "under God" language in the Pledge is trivial and therefore not the proper basis for an Establishment Clause ruling. This Article uses the Pledge controversy as a vehicle for investigating the concept of constitutional trivia in the Establishment Clause context. There are two variations on the argument that the "under God" controversy is trivial. The first variation asserts that the religious component of the Pledge has so little religious significance that it does not rise to the level of an Establishment Clause violation. The second variation acknowledges the religious significance of the "under God" language, but asserts that trivial religious exercises should be considered permissible exceptions. to the normal First Amendment rules. The problem is that neither variation on the triviality defense of the Pledge can be reconciled with a plausible reading of the factual background of the Pledge statute, or with the overwhelming thrust of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause precedents. The triviality defense of the Pledge is therefore difficult to accept at face value. This defense should be viewed instead as a distorted reflection of the growing conflict over the most basic principle of Establishment Clause jurisprudence: Does the Constitution continue to mandate a secular government, or has the subtle sectarian dominance of government become an accepted constitutional fact?
最近,美国第九巡回上诉法院(United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)的一个小组裁定,官方效忠誓词中包含“在上帝之下”(under God)一词违反了第一修正案的政教隔离条款(Establishment Clause),这引起了轩然大波。政客、媒体和法律学者对这一裁决的反应是压倒性的批评。许多这些回应的统一主题是,反对誓词中“在上帝之下”语言的主张是微不足道的,因此不是政教分离条款裁决的适当基础。本文以质押争议为载体,考察政教分离条款背景下的宪法琐事概念。关于“在上帝之下”的争论是微不足道的论点有两种变体。第一种变体主张,誓词中的宗教成分几乎没有宗教意义,因此不会上升到违反政教分离条款的程度。第二种变体承认“在上帝之下”语言的宗教意义,但断言琐碎的宗教活动应被视为允许的例外。不符合第一修正案的规定问题在于,对《保证》的琐碎性辩护的任何变体都不能与对《保证》规约的事实背景的合理解读相调和,也不能与最高法院的政教分离条款先例的压倒性推力相调和。因此,从表面上看,为《承诺》辩护的琐碎性是难以接受的。相反,这种辩护应该被视为对政教分离条款法理学中最基本原则日益增长的冲突的扭曲反映:宪法是否继续授权一个世俗政府,或者政府的微妙教派主导是否已成为公认的宪法事实?