{"title":"Intellectual Budapest, Hungarian Experience and the Republic of Science : Some Different Faces in Mihály Polányi’s Thinking","authors":"E. Kiss","doi":"10.19040/ecocycles.v9i1.257","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The intellectual life in Budapest, since the turn of the twentieth century, developed in fact a hardly evident wealth of intellectual movements. The contours of the fundamental model of Budapest’s intellectual history of that time have been drawn by the interaction of two components. Despite the unavoidable generalization, the following thesis can be presented: the contents of the three “non-simultaneous” great waves of the European Modern Age revealed as “simultaneous” phenomena in the politics, science and aesthetics in the Budapest context. Tacit knowledge was the focus of interest in the second period of Polányi’s sociology of knowledge. He explained the concept, the mechanisms, and the functions of tacit knowledge in several studies and with complete persistence. The process described by Polányi is a ‘real process’. But not a real process can not become the criterion of truth or the foundation of a conception of truth. Most social scientists of that age held the opinion that the fact that the representatives of the Hungarian 1956 formulated and represented values in an explicit way made the judgement of the events impossible as it would violate Max Weber’s principles of value-free judgments. We believe that the evidence of ‘moral truth’ could be based more successfully on so-called fundamental consensus. i.e. consensus in basic values than on the universal truth approach of the sociology of knowledge. One of its constituents has already been mentioned: neither concept of evidence can avoid relativism. Scientific communities also have their own history. Thomas S. Kuhn’s concept of paradigms changed the situation dramatically. It settled scientific communities in the decisive position of scientific production. This theory liberated science very rapidly, also in practice. In this Kuhnian framework was born Polányi’s vision of democracy in the sciences. We don’t know what Polányi would say about our new trends. Certainly, he would stick to his special liberal position.","PeriodicalId":31709,"journal":{"name":"Ecocycles","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ecocycles","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.19040/ecocycles.v9i1.257","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Environmental Science","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The intellectual life in Budapest, since the turn of the twentieth century, developed in fact a hardly evident wealth of intellectual movements. The contours of the fundamental model of Budapest’s intellectual history of that time have been drawn by the interaction of two components. Despite the unavoidable generalization, the following thesis can be presented: the contents of the three “non-simultaneous” great waves of the European Modern Age revealed as “simultaneous” phenomena in the politics, science and aesthetics in the Budapest context. Tacit knowledge was the focus of interest in the second period of Polányi’s sociology of knowledge. He explained the concept, the mechanisms, and the functions of tacit knowledge in several studies and with complete persistence. The process described by Polányi is a ‘real process’. But not a real process can not become the criterion of truth or the foundation of a conception of truth. Most social scientists of that age held the opinion that the fact that the representatives of the Hungarian 1956 formulated and represented values in an explicit way made the judgement of the events impossible as it would violate Max Weber’s principles of value-free judgments. We believe that the evidence of ‘moral truth’ could be based more successfully on so-called fundamental consensus. i.e. consensus in basic values than on the universal truth approach of the sociology of knowledge. One of its constituents has already been mentioned: neither concept of evidence can avoid relativism. Scientific communities also have their own history. Thomas S. Kuhn’s concept of paradigms changed the situation dramatically. It settled scientific communities in the decisive position of scientific production. This theory liberated science very rapidly, also in practice. In this Kuhnian framework was born Polányi’s vision of democracy in the sciences. We don’t know what Polányi would say about our new trends. Certainly, he would stick to his special liberal position.
自20世纪初以来,布达佩斯的知识分子生活实际上发展了一种几乎不明显的知识分子运动财富。当时布达佩斯思想史的基本模型的轮廓是由两个组成部分的相互作用绘制的。在布达佩斯语境下,欧洲近代三次“非同时”大浪潮的内容被揭示为政治、科学和美学的“同时”现象。隐性知识是Polányi知识社会学第二阶段关注的焦点。他在多项研究中对隐性知识的概念、机制和功能进行了详尽的阐述。Polányi所描述的过程是一个“真正的过程”。但不真实的过程不能成为真理的标准或真理概念的基础。那个时代的大多数社会科学家认为,匈牙利1956年的代表以一种明确的方式阐述和代表了价值,这一事实使得对事件的判断不可能,因为它违反了马克斯·韦伯的价值自由判断原则。我们认为,“道德真理”的证据可以更成功地建立在所谓的基本共识的基础上。即在基本价值上的共识,而不是知识社会学的普遍真理方法。它的一个组成部分已经被提到:任何证据的概念都不能避免相对主义。科学界也有自己的历史。Thomas S. Kuhn的范式概念极大地改变了这种情况。它把科学界置于科学生产的决定性地位。这个理论很快地解放了科学,在实践上也是如此。在这种库恩主义的框架下,Polányi对科学中的民主的看法诞生了。我们不知道Polányi会怎么评价我们的新趋势。当然,他会坚持自己特殊的自由主义立场。