Federalism as Docket Control

J. Mazzone, Carl Emery Woock
{"title":"Federalism as Docket Control","authors":"J. Mazzone, Carl Emery Woock","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2573107","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"On the twentieth anniversary of United States v. Lopez (1995), this Article revisits the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution. Much of what has been said about the federalism cases of the Rehnquist Court misses a fundamental aspect of those decisions — one with profound implications for making sense not just of the Rehnquist era but a large component of the Supreme Court’s work since the earliest days of the Republic. Focusing particularly on Lopez and the follow-up case of United States v. Morrison (2000), the Article offers a new perspective on what the Rehnquist Court was up to. We set forth a practical reading of Lopez and Morrison as cases about docket control. In both cases, we suggest, the Court was concerned with shielding the federal district courts from ever-expanding criminal and civil cases that resulted from new federal laws. The Article shows that from the Court’s perspective, docket control was not simply about keeping the caseloads of the district courts at a manageable level. Instead, quite apart from numbers, the Court was concerned with the particular types of cases Congress wanted the district courts to handle. Congress, the Justices feared, was undermining the prestige of the federal judiciary by blurring the distinction between state and federal judges and turning federal judges into petty magistrates. Docket control was thus about protecting the integrity of the third branch of government — a mechanism, in other words, that began in federalism but served also separation of powers. While we draw on a variety of sources in presenting our account, the Article relies heavily on a rich and surprisingly underused resource: the annual testimony by Supreme Court Justices before congressional committees in support of the Court’s annual budgetary requests. These hearings document candid comments by the Justices on a range of issues, including a deep concern with Congress’s treatment of the lower federal courts. Indeed, read with the benefit of hindsight, the hearings show the Justices shortly prior to Lopez and Morrison forecasting the outcomes in those cases and articulating an overlooked rationale underlying the decisions.Our account provokes a rethinking of the constitutional justification for Lopez and Morrison (and other federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court). The two cases, we show, represented the culmination of more than a century of efforts by the Supreme Court to safeguard the role of the judicial branch in our constitutional system. Doctrinally, Lopez and Morrison involved questions of the scope of congressional power and the degree of deference courts owe to Congress when it legislates. By centering on these issues, however, debate over the outcomes in Lopez and Morrison has overlooked a more basic justification for the Court’s rulings. When the Court acts to protect the judiciary — and particularly when it does so after repeated requests to Congress for help — it is on firmer constitutional ground than critics of Lopez and Morrison have recognized. At the time of Lopez and Morrison, the courts were under considerable stress and there was no indication that Congress — continuing to create new federal causes of action — would provide relief. Under those circumstances, the Court’s response, invalidating one criminal statute (in Lopez) and one civil cause of action (in Morrison), was less revolutionary than preservationist. The significance of our account extends beyond explaining a single episode in the history of the Supreme Court. Once cast in terms of docket control, Lopez and Morrison represent not a break — revolutionary or otherwise — but the culmination of a much longer history of over-burdened (and under-appreciated) federal judges pushing back against demands to perform tasks that would distract them from their core functions under the Constitution. Apart from the federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court, many cases — many landmark cases — are better understood in the new light of docket control. (Yes, we even offer a new reading of Marbury v. Madison.) While at first blush docket control may seem less exciting than other accounts of Supreme Court cases, it helps make sense of a good deal of what the Court does and it provides a new lens through which to examine and assess judicial decision-making.","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"94 1","pages":"7-104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2573107","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"North Carolina law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2573107","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

On the twentieth anniversary of United States v. Lopez (1995), this Article revisits the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution. Much of what has been said about the federalism cases of the Rehnquist Court misses a fundamental aspect of those decisions — one with profound implications for making sense not just of the Rehnquist era but a large component of the Supreme Court’s work since the earliest days of the Republic. Focusing particularly on Lopez and the follow-up case of United States v. Morrison (2000), the Article offers a new perspective on what the Rehnquist Court was up to. We set forth a practical reading of Lopez and Morrison as cases about docket control. In both cases, we suggest, the Court was concerned with shielding the federal district courts from ever-expanding criminal and civil cases that resulted from new federal laws. The Article shows that from the Court’s perspective, docket control was not simply about keeping the caseloads of the district courts at a manageable level. Instead, quite apart from numbers, the Court was concerned with the particular types of cases Congress wanted the district courts to handle. Congress, the Justices feared, was undermining the prestige of the federal judiciary by blurring the distinction between state and federal judges and turning federal judges into petty magistrates. Docket control was thus about protecting the integrity of the third branch of government — a mechanism, in other words, that began in federalism but served also separation of powers. While we draw on a variety of sources in presenting our account, the Article relies heavily on a rich and surprisingly underused resource: the annual testimony by Supreme Court Justices before congressional committees in support of the Court’s annual budgetary requests. These hearings document candid comments by the Justices on a range of issues, including a deep concern with Congress’s treatment of the lower federal courts. Indeed, read with the benefit of hindsight, the hearings show the Justices shortly prior to Lopez and Morrison forecasting the outcomes in those cases and articulating an overlooked rationale underlying the decisions.Our account provokes a rethinking of the constitutional justification for Lopez and Morrison (and other federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court). The two cases, we show, represented the culmination of more than a century of efforts by the Supreme Court to safeguard the role of the judicial branch in our constitutional system. Doctrinally, Lopez and Morrison involved questions of the scope of congressional power and the degree of deference courts owe to Congress when it legislates. By centering on these issues, however, debate over the outcomes in Lopez and Morrison has overlooked a more basic justification for the Court’s rulings. When the Court acts to protect the judiciary — and particularly when it does so after repeated requests to Congress for help — it is on firmer constitutional ground than critics of Lopez and Morrison have recognized. At the time of Lopez and Morrison, the courts were under considerable stress and there was no indication that Congress — continuing to create new federal causes of action — would provide relief. Under those circumstances, the Court’s response, invalidating one criminal statute (in Lopez) and one civil cause of action (in Morrison), was less revolutionary than preservationist. The significance of our account extends beyond explaining a single episode in the history of the Supreme Court. Once cast in terms of docket control, Lopez and Morrison represent not a break — revolutionary or otherwise — but the culmination of a much longer history of over-burdened (and under-appreciated) federal judges pushing back against demands to perform tasks that would distract them from their core functions under the Constitution. Apart from the federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court, many cases — many landmark cases — are better understood in the new light of docket control. (Yes, we even offer a new reading of Marbury v. Madison.) While at first blush docket control may seem less exciting than other accounts of Supreme Court cases, it helps make sense of a good deal of what the Court does and it provides a new lens through which to examine and assess judicial decision-making.
作为摘要控制的联邦制
在美国诉洛佩兹案(1995)二十周年之际,本文回顾了伦奎斯特法院的联邦制革命。关于伦奎斯特法院的联邦制案件的许多说法都忽略了这些判决的一个基本方面——一个不仅对伦奎斯特时代有深远意义的方面,而且对共和国早期以来最高法院的工作也有很大影响的方面。该条特别关注洛佩兹和随后的美国诉莫里森案(2000年),为伦奎斯特法院的所作所为提供了一个新的视角。我们提出了对洛佩兹和莫里森作为案件控制案例的实际解读。我们认为,在这两个案件中,法院关心的是保护联邦地区法院不受新联邦法律导致的不断扩大的刑事和民事案件的影响。文章显示,从法院的角度来看,摘要管制并非简单地将区域法院的案件量控制在可管理的水平。相反,除了数字之外,最高法院关心的是国会希望地方法院处理的特定类型的案件。法官们担心,国会模糊了州法官和联邦法官之间的界限,把联邦法官变成了小地方法官,从而损害了联邦司法的威望。因此,摘要控制是为了保护政府第三部门的完整性——换句话说,这一机制始于联邦制,但也为三权分立服务。虽然我们在介绍这篇文章时利用了各种各样的资源,但《宪法》在很大程度上依赖于一种丰富而令人惊讶的未被充分利用的资源:最高法院大法官在国会委员会面前支持法院年度预算请求的年度证词。这些听证会记录了大法官们对一系列问题的坦率评论,包括对国会对待下级联邦法院的深切关注。的确,事后来看,这些听证会表明,在洛佩兹和莫里森之前不久,法官们就预测了这些案件的结果,并阐明了判决背后被忽视的理由。我们的描述引发了对洛佩兹和莫里森(以及伦奎斯特法院的其他联邦主义裁决)的宪法正当性的重新思考。我们认为,这两个案件代表了最高法院一个多世纪以来为维护司法部门在我国宪法制度中的作用所作努力的成果。理论上,洛佩兹和莫里森涉及到国会权力的范围以及法院在立法时对国会的尊重程度等问题。然而,围绕洛佩兹和莫里森案结果的辩论集中在这些问题上,忽视了最高法院裁决的一个更基本的理由。当最高法院采取行动保护司法系统时——特别是当它在多次向国会请求帮助之后这样做时——它的宪法依据比洛佩兹和莫里森的批评者所认识到的更为坚实。在洛佩兹和莫里森的时代,法院承受着相当大的压力,没有迹象表明国会继续创造新的联邦诉讼理由,将提供救济。在这种情况下,法院的回应,即废除一项刑事法规(洛佩兹案)和一项民事诉因(莫里森案),与其说是革命性的,不如说是保护主义的。我们的叙述的意义超出了解释最高法院历史上的一个插曲。一旦从案宗控制的角度来看,洛佩兹和莫里森代表的并不是一种突破——无论是革命性的还是其他的——而是一个更长的历史的高潮,即负担过重(且不受重视)的联邦法官拒绝执行那些会分散他们在宪法下核心职能的任务的要求。除了伦奎斯特法院的联邦主义裁决外,许多案件-许多具有里程碑意义的案件-在摘要控制的新视角下得到了更好的理解。(是的,我们甚至提供了马布里诉麦迪逊案的新解读。)虽然乍一看,对摘要的控制似乎不如对最高法院案件的其他描述那么令人兴奋,但它有助于理解法院的许多工作,并提供了一个审视和评估司法决策的新视角。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信
小红书