{"title":"THE ENDURING RELEVANCE OF KANT'S ANALYSIS OF (RADICAL) EVIL","authors":"Dennis Vanden Auweele","doi":"10.2143/BIJ.73.2.2172315","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Is Kant's2 analysis of (radical) evil still pertinent for philosophical and ethical reflection today? This question is, generally, answered negatively from two distinct angles. The first calls Kant's analysis of radical evil not quite radical enough. Such a charge can be attributed to the bulk of Postmodern reflection on evil which emphasizes the ultimate irrationality of evil. For instance, Emmanuel Levinas states that Kant's rationalized assessment of evil is untenable since the evil Levinas claims to have perceived in the Holocaust lacks any and all criterion to describe it. 3 Evil is the absolute other to goodness that no level of reflection or moral agency can undo. A second angle calls Kant's analysis of radical evil too radical. Such a charge can be attributed to commentators as early as Hegel who attested to the reality of evil but ultimately sublated it within the self-realization of the world-spirit therefore mitigating its radicality within a greater rational scheme of self-unfolding goodness. In a nutshell, Kant's concept of 'radical evil' is stretched between Lutheran pessimism and rationalist Enlightenment optimism, and accordingly fails to appease either Postmodern thinkers who emphasize the radicality of evil or","PeriodicalId":80655,"journal":{"name":"Bijdragen tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie","volume":"73 1","pages":"121 - 142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/BIJ.73.2.2172315","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Bijdragen tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2143/BIJ.73.2.2172315","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
Is Kant's2 analysis of (radical) evil still pertinent for philosophical and ethical reflection today? This question is, generally, answered negatively from two distinct angles. The first calls Kant's analysis of radical evil not quite radical enough. Such a charge can be attributed to the bulk of Postmodern reflection on evil which emphasizes the ultimate irrationality of evil. For instance, Emmanuel Levinas states that Kant's rationalized assessment of evil is untenable since the evil Levinas claims to have perceived in the Holocaust lacks any and all criterion to describe it. 3 Evil is the absolute other to goodness that no level of reflection or moral agency can undo. A second angle calls Kant's analysis of radical evil too radical. Such a charge can be attributed to commentators as early as Hegel who attested to the reality of evil but ultimately sublated it within the self-realization of the world-spirit therefore mitigating its radicality within a greater rational scheme of self-unfolding goodness. In a nutshell, Kant's concept of 'radical evil' is stretched between Lutheran pessimism and rationalist Enlightenment optimism, and accordingly fails to appease either Postmodern thinkers who emphasize the radicality of evil or