THE LATE SCHELLING'S THEO-MONISM OPPOSED TO BADIOU'S SUBTRACTIVE ONTOLOGY

Abstract

Let us assume that since the critique of Western metaphysics as onto-theo-logy that it is no longer possible to conceive of God as a being, even if the oldest or greatest of beings. Let us assume that a simple reversion to negative or apophatic theology, even if it should avoid the pitfalls of onto-theo-logy, is inadequate because it cannot progress as far as one would like. It cannot indicatively afftrm anything of God and if it does speak positively, then only hyperbolically, but certainly not indicatively. Let us further assume that the simple denial of God is inadequate because even most forms of atheism save perhaps Paul Tillich' s a-theism labor under the presuppositions of onto-theology simply to view the only escape in the denial that the first being/cause must exist1 or that it be the greatest being and, hence, deserving of the name "God." Alain Badiou presents an alternative to metaphysics as onto-theo-logy that also does not simply collapse into apophatic theology with his notion of subtractive ontology. As his primary criticism against traditional metaphysics, Badiou forcefully writes, "It is because the One normatively decides on Being that the latter is reduced to what is common, reduced to empty generality. This is why it must also endure the metaphysical preeminence of beings. Metaphysics can be defmed as follows: the enframing of Being by the One" (Briefings, 34). Yet, Badiou presents his counter-metaphysical process as a neutral event and not one expressing the character of personhood. While his event is not indiscernible and so not without signification, it also cannot bear the proper name (Manifesto, 95). This paper advances a notion of thea-monism, a position inspired through readings of F.W.J. von Schelling's positive philosophy of mythology and revelation. The model of God arising from these readings (1) uses the name