Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery

Abstract

In major legal orders such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Asymmetric punishment has been shown to help deter harassment bribery. However, we conjecture that asymmetry is ineffective when applied to collusive bribes. Instead of deterring bribes, asymmetry might enable the briber to enforce the corrupt deal. To test this hypothesis, we design and run a lab experiment in Bonn (Germany) and Shanghai (China) with exactly the same design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment bribers are less likely to report to the authorities. Officials are less likely to grant the favor. In Shanghai, corrupt offers are then also less likely. If we frame the experiment as collusive corruption, effects are less pronounced, but we can replicate all of them.