{"title":"A Particularist Approach to Arguments by Analogy","authors":"José Alhambra","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09616-7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article I defend what I call a ‘particularist approach to arguments by analogy.’ Particularism is opposed to generalism, which is the thesis that arguments by analogy require a universal principle that covers cases compared and guarantees the conclusion. Particularism rejects this claim and holds that arguments by analogy operate on particular cases. I elaborate on two ideas that support this position. On the one hand, I contend that an analogy can be seen as a parallelism of argumentative relationships, drawing on the distinction between similarity and analogy (Gentner 1983) and on the meta-argumentative account of arguments by analogy (Woods and Hudak 1989). On the other hand, I argue that universal principles are not necessary neither for the analysis nor the evaluation of arguments by analogy (Govier 1989) and that, rather than being a requirement, they can be seen as by-products of good analogies.\n</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09616-7.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Argumentation","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10503-023-09616-7","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMMUNICATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this article I defend what I call a ‘particularist approach to arguments by analogy.’ Particularism is opposed to generalism, which is the thesis that arguments by analogy require a universal principle that covers cases compared and guarantees the conclusion. Particularism rejects this claim and holds that arguments by analogy operate on particular cases. I elaborate on two ideas that support this position. On the one hand, I contend that an analogy can be seen as a parallelism of argumentative relationships, drawing on the distinction between similarity and analogy (Gentner 1983) and on the meta-argumentative account of arguments by analogy (Woods and Hudak 1989). On the other hand, I argue that universal principles are not necessary neither for the analysis nor the evaluation of arguments by analogy (Govier 1989) and that, rather than being a requirement, they can be seen as by-products of good analogies.
期刊介绍:
Argumentation is an international and interdisciplinary journal. Its aim is to gather academic contributions from a wide range of scholarly backgrounds and approaches to reasoning, natural inference and persuasion: communication, rhetoric (classical and modern), linguistics, discourse analysis, pragmatics, psychology, philosophy, logic (formal and informal), critical thinking, history and law. Its scope includes a diversity of interests, varying from philosophical, theoretical and analytical to empirical and practical topics. Argumentation publishes papers, book reviews, a yearly bibliography, and announcements of conferences and seminars.To be considered for publication in the journal, a paper must satisfy all of these criteria:1. Report research that is within the journals’ scope: concentrating on argumentation 2. Pose a clear and relevant research question 3. Make a contribution to the literature that connects with the state of the art in the field of argumentation theory 4. Be sound in methodology and analysis 5. Provide appropriate evidence and argumentation for the conclusions 6. Be presented in a clear and intelligible fashion in standard English