{"title":"The Persistent Interlocutor","authors":"Job de Grefte","doi":"10.1007/s10503-022-09578-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A Persistent Interlocutor (PI) is someone who, in argumentative contexts, does not cease to question her opponent’s premises. The epistemic relevance of the PI has been debated throughout the history of philosophy. Pyrrhonians famously claim that our inability to dialectically vindicate our claims against a PI implies scepticism. Adam Leite disagrees (2005). Michael Resorla argues that the debate is based on a false premise (2009). In this paper, I argue that these views all fail to accurately account for the epistemic relevance of the PI. I then briefly present an account that aims to do better in this regard, based on the modal notion of safety. On the account proposed, the PI does not violate epistemic or dialectical norms. Rather, her behaviour tends to be epistemically perverse in the sense that it wastes cognitive resources. Perhaps surprisingly, this defect turns out not to be unique to the PI.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 1","pages":"53 - 68"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-022-09578-2.pdf","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Argumentation","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10503-022-09578-2","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMMUNICATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
A Persistent Interlocutor (PI) is someone who, in argumentative contexts, does not cease to question her opponent’s premises. The epistemic relevance of the PI has been debated throughout the history of philosophy. Pyrrhonians famously claim that our inability to dialectically vindicate our claims against a PI implies scepticism. Adam Leite disagrees (2005). Michael Resorla argues that the debate is based on a false premise (2009). In this paper, I argue that these views all fail to accurately account for the epistemic relevance of the PI. I then briefly present an account that aims to do better in this regard, based on the modal notion of safety. On the account proposed, the PI does not violate epistemic or dialectical norms. Rather, her behaviour tends to be epistemically perverse in the sense that it wastes cognitive resources. Perhaps surprisingly, this defect turns out not to be unique to the PI.
期刊介绍：
Argumentation is an international and interdisciplinary journal. Its aim is to gather academic contributions from a wide range of scholarly backgrounds and approaches to reasoning, natural inference and persuasion: communication, rhetoric (classical and modern), linguistics, discourse analysis, pragmatics, psychology, philosophy, logic (formal and informal), critical thinking, history and law. Its scope includes a diversity of interests, varying from philosophical, theoretical and analytical to empirical and practical topics. Argumentation publishes papers, book reviews, a yearly bibliography, and announcements of conferences and seminars.To be considered for publication in the journal, a paper must satisfy all of these criteria:1. Report research that is within the journals’ scope: concentrating on argumentation 2. Pose a clear and relevant research question 3. Make a contribution to the literature that connects with the state of the art in the field of argumentation theory 4. Be sound in methodology and analysis 5. Provide appropriate evidence and argumentation for the conclusions 6. Be presented in a clear and intelligible fashion in standard English
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
