Serafín Frache , Javier García-Cicco , Jorge Ponce
{"title":"Countercyclical prudential tools in an estimated DSGE model","authors":"Serafín Frache , Javier García-Cicco , Jorge Ponce","doi":"10.1016/j.latcb.2023.100095","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for a small, open economy with a banking sector and endogenous default to assess two macroprudential tools: countercyclical capital buffers (CCB) and dynamic provisions (DP). The model is estimated with data for Uruguay, where dynamic provisioning has existed since the early 2000s. Both tools force banks to build buffers, but DP seem to outperform the CCB in smoothing the cycle. We also find that the source of the shock affecting the financial system matters in assessing the relative performance of both tools. Given a positive external shock, the credit-to-GDP ratio decreases, which should discourage its use as an indicator variable to activate countercyclical regulation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100867,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Journal of Central Banking","volume":"4 3","pages":"Article 100095"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Latin American Journal of Central Banking","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666143823000169","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
We developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for a small, open economy with a banking sector and endogenous default to assess two macroprudential tools: countercyclical capital buffers (CCB) and dynamic provisions (DP). The model is estimated with data for Uruguay, where dynamic provisioning has existed since the early 2000s. Both tools force banks to build buffers, but DP seem to outperform the CCB in smoothing the cycle. We also find that the source of the shock affecting the financial system matters in assessing the relative performance of both tools. Given a positive external shock, the credit-to-GDP ratio decreases, which should discourage its use as an indicator variable to activate countercyclical regulation.