Aligning incentives: The effect of mortgage servicing rules on foreclosures and delinquency

Abstract

Foreclosures have large societal costs, and in many cases are more costly to mortgage-holders than the borrower resuming payments. In 2014, the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) implemented regulations for mortgage servicers aimed at addressing servicer conduct that may have led to unnecessary foreclosures in the late 2000s. The rule included a new requirement to delay foreclosure until borrowers were at least 120-days delinquent in most cases, up from typically 90 days. I use a large panel of mortgage performance data to estimate the effect of the CFPB rules on foreclosures, and on the ability of delinquent borrowers to recover and become current. I find the rule reduced the incidence of foreclosure within three years, and increased the incidence of recovery. The minimum delinquency requirement seems to have been a factor. In a separate analysis using a unique dataset of detailed loan-level information from seven mortgage servicing firms, borrowers who became 90-days delinquent after the rule went into effect were six percentage points less likely to have foreclosure initiated within two months. I also find that the rule had larger effects on loans that would be more likely to receive a successful loan modification based on mortgage holder policies.