Ceasefire Violations: Why They Occur and How They Relate to Strategic Decision-Making Processes

Abstract

Almost all ceasefires experience violations, yet we know little about how such violations relate to the military and political aspirations of conflict parties. This article builds on ceasefire and bargaining literature to understand why ceasefire violations occur and how they relate to strategic decision-making processes. Building on these theoretical insights, it proposes a typology of four main types of ceasefire violations: strategic violations serve to strengthen the military advantage of a conflict party, retaliatory violations seek to ensure ceasefire compliance, spoiling violations aim to undermine the efforts of leaders, and localized violations are delinked from strategic decision-making processes. A case study of a major ceasefire violation in the Bangsamoro peace process illustrates how we may use informal Bayesian reasoning to empirically distinguish between these different types of violations. Treating ceasefire violations as part of wider military and political processes enables us to better understand the causal conditions under which ceasefire violations occur and identify strategic interests of different actors to carry out these violations. This helps explain the varied responses to ceasefire violations and sharpens our understanding of how to address them.