{"title":"Phenomenology of the Turing test: a Levinasian perspective","authors":"Matthew S Lindia","doi":"10.1093/joc/jqad026","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article considers the Turing test as a problem of communication, particularly by asking how the language of artificial intelligence (AI) appears to human experience in comparison to the language of the Other. This question is approached through Levinas’ philosophy, by considering the possibility of AI as an absolute alterity, rather than reducing its alterity to the Same. This perspective diverges from traditional accounts of AI, which are more concerned with identifying structures of consciousness in the machine that are analogous to those evident in firsthand experience. This article asks how exactly AI appears to human consciousness, and whether this appearance precludes the appearance of AI as a thinking-being. In the final analysis, the author argues that AI diverges from Levinas’ understanding of alterity, which centers around the exteriority of the Other. The alterity of AI, in contrast, centers around anteriority, defined as the appearance of language's origin-in-itself.","PeriodicalId":48410,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Communication","volume":"10 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Communication","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqad026","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMMUNICATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article considers the Turing test as a problem of communication, particularly by asking how the language of artificial intelligence (AI) appears to human experience in comparison to the language of the Other. This question is approached through Levinas’ philosophy, by considering the possibility of AI as an absolute alterity, rather than reducing its alterity to the Same. This perspective diverges from traditional accounts of AI, which are more concerned with identifying structures of consciousness in the machine that are analogous to those evident in firsthand experience. This article asks how exactly AI appears to human consciousness, and whether this appearance precludes the appearance of AI as a thinking-being. In the final analysis, the author argues that AI diverges from Levinas’ understanding of alterity, which centers around the exteriority of the Other. The alterity of AI, in contrast, centers around anteriority, defined as the appearance of language's origin-in-itself.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Communication, the flagship journal of the International Communication Association, is a vital publication for communication specialists and policymakers alike. Focusing on communication research, practice, policy, and theory, it delivers the latest and most significant findings in communication studies. The journal also includes an extensive book review section and symposia of selected studies on current issues. JoC publishes top-quality scholarship on all aspects of communication, with a particular interest in research that transcends disciplinary and sub-field boundaries.