Free will determines the limits of psychological foresight: Review of “Free Will” by Sam Harris

David J. Grüning
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The existence of free will and its prerequisites have entertained countless debates. The position one takes in these debates dictates their outlook on limitations of predicting human psychology. Sam Harris (2012), in his book, misses out on exploring these consequences accepting or rejecting free will has for the predictability of human decision-making and action-taking. Likewise, referencers of his work addressed this topic only peripherally and, to the best of my knowledge, have never explored its consequences in depth. Therefore, in the present review, I aim to demonstrate and formalize the following: If we understand human cognition and behavior as the result of environmental and individual causes that both are knowable, adding a per definition indeterminable source, namely, free will, can only reduce the maximum possible power of any used prediction model. Accepting a free human will renders error-free foresight theoretically, and empirically, impossible. This has consequences for all forecasting and planning methods that concern human agents as well as their tools’ utility (e.g., scenarios and psychological analysis). I address the consequences free will belief has conceptually for three application fields: management and leadership, historic analysis, and theory building.

自由意志决定心理预见的极限——评Sam Harris的《自由意志》
自由意志的存在及其先决条件引发了无数争论。人们在这些争论中的立场决定了他们对预测人类心理局限性的看法。Sam Harris(2012)在他的书中错过了探索接受或拒绝自由意志对人类决策和行动的可预测性的这些后果。同样,他的作品的参考者只是对这个话题进行了旁敲侧击,据我所知,他们从未深入探讨过它的后果。因此,在本综述中,我旨在证明并形式化以下内容:如果我们将人类的认知和行为理解为环境和个人原因的结果,而这两者都是已知的,那么增加一个根据定义的不确定来源,即自由意志,只会降低任何使用的预测模型的最大可能功率。接受一个自由的人类意志使无错误的预见在理论上和经验上都是不可能的。这对所有涉及人类主体及其工具效用(如情景和心理分析)的预测和规划方法都有影响。我从概念上阐述了自由意志信念在三个应用领域的后果:管理和领导力、历史分析和理论构建。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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