Fungicide resistance and misinformation: A game theoretic approach

Abstract

Fungicide resistance is a serious problem for agriculture today. This analysis provides additional insight into the strategic behavior of farmers when their fungicide use generates a negative intertemporal production externality in the form of fungicide resistance. We find that when farmers encounter this type of externality, they choose fungicide levels that exacerbate fungicide resistance. We examine a compensation mechanism in which a farmer reduces fungicide use in exchange for a transfer. This mechanism reduces fungicide use; however, misinformation about the severity of fungicide resistance generates distortions. We find that one-sided misinformation could lead a farmer to choose socially optimal fungicide levels, which makes the compensation mechanism less necessary. In addition, we show that when both farmers are misinformed, the mechanism could lead farmers to choose fungicide levels below the socially optimal level depending on their pessimistic beliefs about the severity of fungicide resistance.